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Applied "check on BER decoding" security fix

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This commit is contained in:
Arne Fitzenreiter
2008-06-10 00:57:31 +02:00
parent d12153b083
commit aaf3836269
2 changed files with 136 additions and 0 deletions
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3
lfs/linux
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@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects))
@rm -rf $(DIR_APP) $(DIR_SRC)/linux $(DIR_SRC)/xen-* && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar jxf $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE)
ln -s linux-$(VER) /usr/src/linux
# Security fix for CIFS & Netfilter SNMP
cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/linux-2.6.20.21-additional_check_on_BER_decoding.patch
# Openswan 2
cd $(DIR_SRC) && rm -rf openswan-*
cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar xfz $(DIR_DL)/openswan-2.4.12.tar.gz

133
src/patches/linux-2.6.20.21-additional_check_on_BER_decoding.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:16:33 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding (CVE-2008-1673)
X-Git-Tag: v2.6.25.5~1
X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Fstable%2Flinux-2.6.25.y.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=33afb8403f361919aa5c8fe1d0a4f5ddbfbbea3c
asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding (CVE-2008-1673)
upstream commit: ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first subid actually encodes first 2 subids.
- A primitive encoding may not have an indefinite length.
Thanks to Wei Wang from McAfee for report.
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
rediff for Linux-2.6.20.21 by Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
---
From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:16:33 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding (CVE-2008-1673)
X-Git-Tag: v2.6.25.5~1
X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Fstable%2Flinux-2.6.25.y.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=33afb8403f361919aa5c8fe1d0a4f5ddbfbbea3c
asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding (CVE-2008-1673)
upstream commit: ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first subid actually encodes first 2 subids.
- A primitive encoding may not have an indefinite length.
Thanks to Wei Wang from McAfee for report.
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
rediff for Linux-2.6.20.21 by Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
---
diff -Naur linux-2.6.20.21.org/fs/cifs/asn1.c linux-2.6.20.21/fs/cifs/asn1.c
--- linux-2.6.20.21.org/fs/cifs/asn1.c 2007-10-17 21:31:14.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.20.21/fs/cifs/asn1.c 2008-06-10 00:09:43.000000000 +0200
@@ -182,6 +182,11 @@
}
}
}
+
+ /* don't trust len bigger than ctx buffer */
+ if (*len > ctx->end - ctx->pointer)
+ return 0;
+
return 1;
}
@@ -199,6 +204,10 @@
if (!asn1_length_decode(ctx, &def, &len))
return 0;
+ /* primitive shall be definite, indefinite shall be constructed */
+ if (*con == ASN1_PRI && !def)
+ return 0;
+
if (def)
*eoc = ctx->pointer + len;
else
@@ -385,6 +394,10 @@
unsigned long *optr;
size = eoc - ctx->pointer + 1;
+
+ /* first subid actually encodes first two subids */
+ if (size < 2 || size > ULONG_MAX/sizeof(unsigned long))
+ return 0;
*oid = kmalloc(size * sizeof (unsigned long), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (*oid == NULL) {
return 0;
diff -Naur linux-2.6.20.21.org/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c linux-2.6.20.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c
--- linux-2.6.20.21.org/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c 2007-10-17 21:31:14.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.20.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c 2008-06-10 00:03:59.000000000 +0200
@@ -235,6 +235,11 @@
}
}
}
+
+ /* don't trust len bigger than ctx buffer */
+ if (*len > ctx->end - ctx->pointer)
+ return 0;
+
return 1;
}
@@ -253,6 +258,10 @@
if (!asn1_length_decode(ctx, &def, &len))
return 0;
+ /* primitive shall be definite, indefinite shall be constructed */
+ if (*con == ASN1_PRI && !def)
+ return 0;
+
if (def)
*eoc = ctx->pointer + len;
else
@@ -437,6 +446,11 @@
unsigned long *optr;
size = eoc - ctx->pointer + 1;
+
+ /* first subid actually encodes first two subids */
+ if (size < 2 || size > ULONG_MAX/sizeof(unsigned long))
+ return 0;
+
*oid = kmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (*oid == NULL) {
if (net_ratelimit())