squid: Fix two security issues.

* CVE-2013-4115
* CVE-2013-4123

http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v3/3.1/changesets/
This commit is contained in:
Michael Tremer
2013-08-07 22:15:31 +02:00
parent 726a85b8c1
commit 7323724196
4 changed files with 131 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../common/squid

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@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects))
@$(PREBUILD)
@rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar xjf $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE)
cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np0 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squid-3.1-10486.patch
cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np0 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squid-3.1-10487.patch
cd $(DIR_APP) && ./configure --prefix=/usr --disable-nls \
--datadir=/usr/lib/squid \
--mandir=/usr/share/man --libexecdir=/usr/lib/squid \

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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
------------------------------------------------------------
revno: 10486
revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130222111325-zizr296kq3te4g7h
parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130109021503-hqg7ufldrudpzr9l
fixes bug(s): http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3790
author: Reinhard Sojka <reinhard.sojka@parlament.gv.at>
committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
branch nick: SQUID_3_1
timestamp: Fri 2013-02-22 04:13:25 -0700
message:
Bug 3790: cachemgr.cgi crash with authentication
------------------------------------------------------------
# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130222111325-zizr296kq3te4g7h
# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/branches\
# /SQUID_3_1
# testament_sha1: 121adf68a9c3b2eca766cfb768256b6b57d9816b
# timestamp: 2013-02-22 11:17:18 +0000
# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/branches\
# /SQUID_3_1
# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130109021503-\
# hqg7ufldrudpzr9l
#
# Begin patch
=== modified file 'tools/cachemgr.cc'
--- tools/cachemgr.cc 2013-01-08 23:11:51 +0000
+++ tools/cachemgr.cc 2013-02-22 11:13:25 +0000
@@ -1162,7 +1162,6 @@
{
static char buf[1024];
size_t stringLength = 0;
- const char *str64;
if (!req->passwd)
return "";
@@ -1171,15 +1170,12 @@
req->user_name ? req->user_name : "",
req->passwd);
- str64 = base64_encode(buf);
-
- stringLength += snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Authorization: Basic %s\r\n", str64);
+ stringLength += snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Authorization: Basic %s\r\n", base64_encode(buf));
assert(stringLength < sizeof(buf));
- snprintf(&buf[stringLength], sizeof(buf) - stringLength, "Proxy-Authorization: Basic %s\r\n", str64);
+ snprintf(&buf[stringLength], sizeof(buf) - stringLength, "Proxy-Authorization: Basic %s\r\n", base64_encode(buf));
- xxfree(str64);
return buf;
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
------------------------------------------------------------
revno: 10487
revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130710124748-2n6111r04xsi71vx
parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130222111325-zizr296kq3te4g7h
author: Nathan Hoad <nathan@getoffmalawn.com>
committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
branch nick: SQUID_3_1
timestamp: Wed 2013-07-10 06:47:48 -0600
message:
Protect against buffer overrun in DNS query generation
see SQUID-2013:2.
This bug has been present as long as the internal DNS component however
most code reaching this point is passing through URL validation first.
With Squid-3.2 Host header verification using DNS directly we may have
problems.
------------------------------------------------------------
# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130710124748-2n6111r04xsi71vx
# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/branches\
# /SQUID_3_1
# testament_sha1: b5be85c8876ce15ec8fa173845e61755b6942fe0
# timestamp: 2013-07-10 12:48:57 +0000
# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/branches\
# /SQUID_3_1
# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20130222111325-\
# zizr296kq3te4g7h
#
# Begin patch
=== modified file 'src/dns_internal.cc'
--- src/dns_internal.cc 2011-10-11 02:12:56 +0000
+++ src/dns_internal.cc 2013-07-10 12:47:48 +0000
@@ -1532,22 +1532,26 @@
void
idnsALookup(const char *name, IDNSCB * callback, void *data)
{
- unsigned int i;
+ size_t nameLength = strlen(name);
+
+ // Prevent buffer overflow on q->name
+ if (nameLength > NS_MAXDNAME) {
+ debugs(23, DBG_IMPORTANT, "SECURITY ALERT: DNS name too long to perform lookup: '" << name << "'. see access.log for details.");
+ callback(data, NULL, 0, "Internal error");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (idnsCachedLookup(name, callback, data))
+ return;
+
+ idns_query *q = cbdataAlloc(idns_query);
+ q->id = idnsQueryID();
int nd = 0;
- idns_query *q;
-
- if (idnsCachedLookup(name, callback, data))
- return;
-
- q = cbdataAlloc(idns_query);
-
- q->id = idnsQueryID();
-
- for (i = 0; i < strlen(name); i++)
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nameLength; ++i)
if (name[i] == '.')
nd++;
- if (Config.onoff.res_defnames && npc > 0 && name[strlen(name)-1] != '.') {
+ if (Config.onoff.res_defnames && npc > 0 && name[nameLength-1] != '.') {
q->do_searchpath = 1;
} else {
q->do_searchpath = 0;