misc-progs: Re-indent setuid.c.

This commit is contained in:
Michael Tremer
2013-10-12 18:47:16 +02:00
parent 1293811896
commit 2dcea58cc2

View File

@@ -57,44 +57,41 @@ char * trusted_env[4] = {
* validate the command you are passing. If the command is formed from user
* input be sure to check this input is what you expect. Nasty things can
* happen if a user can inject ; or `` into your command for example */
int safe_system(char* command)
{
return system_core( command, 0, 0, "safe_system" );
int safe_system(char* command) {
return system_core(command, 0, 0, "safe_system");
}
/* Much like safe_system but lets you specify a non-root uid and gid to run
* the command as */
int unpriv_system(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
return system_core(command, uid, gid, "unpriv_system" );
int unpriv_system(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
return system_core(command, uid, gid, "unpriv_system");
}
int system_core(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error)
{
int system_core(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error) {
int pid, status;
if(!command)
return 1;
switch( pid = fork() )
{
switch(pid = fork()) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0: /* child */
{
char * argv[4];
if (gid && setgid(gid))
{
case 0: /* child */ {
char *argv[4];
if (gid && setgid(gid)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
perror("Couldn't setgid");
exit(127);
}
if (uid && setuid(uid))
{
if (uid && setuid(uid)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
perror("Couldn't setuid");
exit(127);
}
argv[0] = "sh";
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command;
@@ -104,13 +101,15 @@ int system_core(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error)
perror("execve failed");
exit(127);
}
default: /* parent */
do {
if( waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1 ) {
if( errno != EINTR )
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR)
return -1;
} else
} else {
return status;
}
} while (1);
}
@@ -120,37 +119,51 @@ int system_core(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error)
* environment in a known state. Returns 1 on success, if initsetuid() returns
* 0 then you should exit(1) immediately, DON'T attempt to recover from the
* error */
int initsetuid(void)
{
int fds,i;
int initsetuid(void) {
int fds, i;
struct stat st;
struct rlimit rlim;
/* Prevent signal tricks by ignoring all except SIGKILL and SIGCHILD */
for( i = 0; i < NSIG; i++ ) {
if( i != SIGKILL && i != SIGCHLD )
signal(i, SIG_IGN);
for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) {
if (i != SIGKILL && i != SIGCHLD)
signal(i, SIG_IGN);
}
/* dump all non-standard file descriptors (a full descriptor table could
* lead to DoS by preventing us opening files) */
if ((fds = getdtablesize()) == -1) fds = OPEN_MAX;
for( i = 3; i < fds; i++ ) close(i);
if ((fds = getdtablesize()) == -1)
fds = OPEN_MAX;
for (i = 3; i < fds; i++)
close(i);
/* check stdin, stdout & stderr are open before going any further */
for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ )
if( fstat(i, &st) == -1 && ((errno != EBADF) || (close(i), open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != i ))
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if( fstat(i, &st) == -1 && ((errno != EBADF) || (close(i), open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != i))
return 0;
/* disable core dumps in case we're processing sensitive information */
rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
if(setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim))
{ perror("Couldn't disable core dumps"); return 0; }
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim)) {
perror("Couldn't disable core dumps");
return 0;
}
/* drop any supplementary groups, set uid & gid to root */
if (setgroups(0, NULL)) { perror("Couldn't clear group list"); return 0; }
if (setgid(0)) { perror("Couldn't setgid(0)"); return 0; }
if (setuid(0)) { perror("Couldn't setuid(0)"); return 0; }
if (setgroups(0, NULL)) {
perror("Couldn't clear group list");
return 0;
}
if (setgid(0)) {
perror("Couldn't setgid(0)");
return 0;
}
if (setuid(0)) {
perror("Couldn't setuid(0)");
return 0;
}
return 1;
}