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14c65ab71c
Malicious/vulnerable TTY line disciplines have been subject of some kernel exploits such as CVE-2017-2636, and since - to put it in Greg Kroah-Hatrman's words - we do not "trust the userspace to do the right thing", this reduces local kernel attack surface. Further, there is no legitimate reason why an unprivileged user should load kernel modules during runtime, anyway. See also: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/4/15/890 - https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2017/03/24/CVE-2017-2636.html Cc: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter@ipfire.org> Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
110 lines
3.6 KiB
Plaintext
110 lines
3.6 KiB
Plaintext
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1
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net.ipv4.ip_dynaddr = 1
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net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
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net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
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net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit = 1000
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net.ipv4.icmp_ratemask = 6168
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net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
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net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 30
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net.ipv4.tcp_syn_retries = 3
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net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3
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net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_filter = 1
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net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
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net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = 1
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net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
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kernel.printk = 1 4 1 7
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vm.mmap_min_addr = 4096
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vm.min_free_kbytes = 8192
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# Disable IPv6 by default.
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net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
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net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
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# Enable netfilter accounting
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net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_acct = 1
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# Disable netfilter on bridges.
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net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 0
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net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables = 0
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net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-arptables = 0
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# Restrict loading TTY line disciplines to CAP_SYS_MODULE to prevent unprivileged attackers
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# from loading vulnerable line disciplines with the TIOCSETD ioctl.
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dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
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# Try to keep kernel address exposures out of various /proc files (kallsyms, modules, etc).
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kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
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# Avoid kernel memory address exposures via dmesg.
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kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
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# Turn on hard- and symlink protection
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fs.protected_symlinks = 1
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fs.protected_hardlinks = 1
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# Don't allow writes to files and FIFOs that we don't own in world writable sticky
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# directories, unless they are owned by the owner of the directory.
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fs.protected_fifos = 2
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fs.protected_regular = 2
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# Minimal preemption granularity for CPU-bound tasks:
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# (default: 1 msec# (1 + ilog(ncpus)), units: nanoseconds)
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kernel.sched_min_granularity_ns = 10000000
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# If a workload mostly uses anonymous memory and it hits this limit, the entire
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# working set is buffered for I/O, and any more write buffering would require
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# swapping, so it's time to throttle writes until I/O can catch up. Workloads
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# that mostly use file mappings may be able to use even higher values.
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#
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# The generator of dirty data starts writeback at this percentage (system default
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# is 20%)
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vm.dirty_ratio = 10
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# Start background writeback (via writeback threads) at this percentage (system
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# default is 10%)
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vm.dirty_background_ratio = 3
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# The swappiness parameter controls the tendency of the kernel to move
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# processes out of physical memory and onto the swap disk.
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# 0 tells the kernel to avoid swapping processes out of physical memory
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# for as long as possible
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# 100 tells the kernel to aggressively swap processes out of physical memory
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# and move them to swap cache
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vm.swappiness = 1
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# The total time the scheduler will consider a migrated process
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# "cache hot" and thus less likely to be re-migrated
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# (system default is 500000, i.e. 0.5 ms)
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kernel.sched_migration_cost_ns = 5000000
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# Increase kernel buffer size maximums
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net.ipv4.tcp_mem = 16777216 16777216 16777216
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net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 16777216
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net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 16384 16777216
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net.ipv4.udp_mem = 3145728 4194304 16777216
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# Prefer low latency over higher throughput
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net.ipv4.tcp_low_latency = 1
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# Reserve more socket space for the TCP window
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net.ipv4.tcp_adv_win_scale = 2
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# Enable TCP fast-open
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net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen = 3
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# Drop RST packets for sockets in TIME-WAIT state, as described in RFC 1337.
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# This protects against various TCP attacks, such as DoS against or injection
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# of arbitrary segments into prematurely closed connections.
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net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1
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