Files
bpfire/config/etc/sysctl.conf
Peter Müller dc5a89c948 sysctl.conf: drop RST packets for sockets in TIME-WAIT state
RFC 1337 describes various TCP (side channel) attacks against
prematurely closed connections stalling in TIME-WAIT state, such as DoS
or injecting arbitrary TCP segments, and recommends to silently discard
RST packets for sockets in this state.

While applications still tied to such sockets should tolerate invalid
input (thanks to Jon Postel), there is little legitimate reason to send
such RST packets altogether.

At the time of writing, no collateral damage related to active RFC 1337
implementations is known. Measuerements in productive environments did
not reveal any side effects either, which is why I consider enabling RFC
1337 implementation to be a safe change.

See also: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1337

Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
2020-09-30 17:14:07 +00:00

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net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1
net.ipv4.ip_dynaddr = 1
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit = 1000
net.ipv4.icmp_ratemask = 6168
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 30
net.ipv4.tcp_syn_retries = 3
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3
net.ipv4.conf.default.arp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
kernel.printk = 1 4 1 7
vm.mmap_min_addr = 4096
vm.min_free_kbytes = 8192
# Disable IPv6 by default.
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
# Enable netfilter accounting
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_acct = 1
# Disable netfilter on bridges.
net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 0
net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables = 0
net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-arptables = 0
# Try to keep kernel address exposures out of various /proc files (kallsyms, modules, etc).
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
# Avoid kernel memory address exposures via dmesg.
kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
# Turn on hard- and symlink protection
fs.protected_symlinks = 1
fs.protected_hardlinks = 1
# Minimal preemption granularity for CPU-bound tasks:
# (default: 1 msec# (1 + ilog(ncpus)), units: nanoseconds)
kernel.sched_min_granularity_ns = 10000000
# If a workload mostly uses anonymous memory and it hits this limit, the entire
# working set is buffered for I/O, and any more write buffering would require
# swapping, so it's time to throttle writes until I/O can catch up. Workloads
# that mostly use file mappings may be able to use even higher values.
#
# The generator of dirty data starts writeback at this percentage (system default
# is 20%)
vm.dirty_ratio = 10
# Start background writeback (via writeback threads) at this percentage (system
# default is 10%)
vm.dirty_background_ratio = 3
# The swappiness parameter controls the tendency of the kernel to move
# processes out of physical memory and onto the swap disk.
# 0 tells the kernel to avoid swapping processes out of physical memory
# for as long as possible
# 100 tells the kernel to aggressively swap processes out of physical memory
# and move them to swap cache
vm.swappiness = 1
# The total time the scheduler will consider a migrated process
# "cache hot" and thus less likely to be re-migrated
# (system default is 500000, i.e. 0.5 ms)
kernel.sched_migration_cost_ns = 5000000
# Increase kernel buffer size maximums
net.ipv4.tcp_mem = 16777216 16777216 16777216
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 16777216
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 16384 16777216
net.ipv4.udp_mem = 3145728 4194304 16777216
# Prefer low latency over higher throughput
net.ipv4.tcp_low_latency = 1
# Reserve more socket space for the TCP window
net.ipv4.tcp_adv_win_scale = 2
# Enable TCP fast-open
net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen = 3
# Drop RST packets for sockets in TIME-WAIT state, as described in RFC 1337.
# This protects against various TCP attacks, such as DoS against or injection
# of arbitrary segments into prematurely closed connections.
net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337 = 1