Allowing outgoing DNS traffic (destination port 53, both TCP
and UDP) to the root servers is BCP for some reasons. First,
RFC 5011 assumes resolvers are able to fetch new trust ancors
from the root servers for a certain time period in order to
do key rollovers.
Second, Unbound shows some side effects if it cannot do trust
anchor signaling (see RFC 8145) or fetch the current trust anchor,
resulting in SERVFAILs for arbitrary requests a few minutes.
There is little security implication of allowing DNS traffic
to the root servers: An attacker might abuse this for exfiltrating
data via DNS queries, but is unable to infiltrate data unless
he gains control over at least one root server instance. If
there is no firewall ruleset in place which prohibits any other
DNS traffic than to chosen DNS servers, this patch will not
have security implications at all.
The second version of this patch does not use unnecessary xargs-
call nor changes anything else not related to this issue.
Fixes#12183
Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Suggested-by: Horace Michael <horace.michael@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Having raised the overall log rate limit to 10 packet per second
in Core Update 136, this did not affected rules generated by the
user. In order to stay consistent, this patch also raises log rate
limit for these.
In order to avoid side effects on firewalls with slow disks, it
was probably better touch these categories separately, so testing
users won't be DoSsed instantly. :-)
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
