These rulefiles are used by various providers as a kind of reference and
to store rules which have been taken out for correctness, performance
reasons or because of other reasons.
Fixes#12794.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
OpenSSL Security Advisory [15 March 2022]
============================================
Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates
(CVE-2022-0778)
==================================================================================
Severity: High
The BN_mod_sqrt() function, which computes a modular square root,
contains
a bug that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli.
Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain
elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve
parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate
that
has invalid explicit curve parameters.
Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the
certificate
signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate
may thus
be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also be
reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit
elliptic curve parameters.
Thus vulnerable situations include:
- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from
subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters
Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the
attacker
can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue.
In the OpenSSL 1.0.2 version the public key is not parsed during initial
parsing of the certificate which makes it slightly harder to trigger
the infinite loop. However any operation which requires the public key
from the certificate will trigger the infinite loop. In particular the
attacker can use a self-signed certificate to trigger the loop during
verification of the certificate signature.
This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0. It was
addressed in the releases of 1.1.1n and 3.0.2 on the 15th March 2022.
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2zd (premium support customers
only)
OpenSSL 1.1.1 users should upgrade to 1.1.1n
OpenSSL 3.0 users should upgrade to 3.0.2
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on the 24th February 2022 by Tavis
Ormandy
from Google. The fix was developed by David Benjamin from Google and
Tomáš Mráz
from OpenSSL.
Note
====
OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates.
Extended
support is available for premium support customers:
https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html
OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any
kind.
It is affected by the issue.
Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.0 or 1.1.1.
References
==========
URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20220315.txt
Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details
over time.
For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Only extract rulefiles which are located in a rules directory and/or in the archive
root.
This prevents us from extracting experimental or binary rules etc. which
often are located in corresponding sub-directories.
Reference: #12794.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
The current setup can fail and block all traffic on RED if the RETURN
rules could not be created.
This can happen when the kernel fails to load the ipset module, as it is
the case after upgrading to a new kernel. Restarting the firewall will
cause that the system is being cut off the internet.
This design now changes that if those rules cannot be created, the
DROP_HOSTILE feature is just inactive, but it would not disrupt any
traffic.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Weismüller <daniel.weismueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This filelist is there to ship files that contain the version number of
a release and *must* be shipped every time. For that, they will need to
be a part of the filelist.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Sometimes, we restore a backup that has been created earlier before
exclude files have been changed. To avoid overwriting those files, we
will consider the exlude list upon restore.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This file is a system configuration file and does not contain any
configruation from the user.
Since it can be overwritten in a backup and restored to an older state,
this can cause problems such as #12788.
Fixes: #12788
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
We are almost running as an unprivileged user and therfore have not
the permissions to do this.
This will save us a lot of confusion error messages.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
In case a rulestarball contains several same-named rulefiles
they have been overwritten each time and so only contained the content
from the last extracted one.
Now the content of those files will be merged by appending the content
to the first extracted one for each time.
Fixes#12792.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
In case a rulestarball contains several same-named rulefiles
they have been overwritten each time and so only contained the content
from the last extracted one.
Now the content of those files will be merged by appending the content
to the first extracted one for each time.
Fixes#12792.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
This commit allows the ipset_restore() function to auto-detect
which set file needs to be restored.
Currently it is limitated to country codes only, because we currently
does not support anything else.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Instead of stupidly destroying all ipsets, we now grab the already loaded sets
and compare them with the loaded sets during runtime of the script.
So we are now able to determine which sets are not longer required and
safely can destroy (unload) at a later time.
This saves us from taking care about dropping/flushing rules which are
based on ipset before we can destroy them - because only unused sets are
affected.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Inspired-by: Tim FitzGeorge <ipfr@tfitzgeorge.me.uk>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
We are almost running as an unprivileged user and therfore have not
the permissions to do this.
This will save us a lot of confusion error messages.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Sometimes, we restore a backup that has been created earlier before
exclude files have been changed. To avoid overwriting those files, we
will consider the exlude list upon restore.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This file is a system configuration file and does not contain any
configruation from the user.
Since it can be overwritten in a backup and restored to an older state,
this can cause problems such as #12788.
Fixes: #12788
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
our current suricata version not support JA3 based rules so
this drop the providers from the list.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
