These include rootfiles, firewall menue entries that have been
unmaintained for a long time, and firewall chains which were never used
in recent time.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
If this module is not being loaded, the kernel will mark any
GRE connection as INVALID in connection tracking, which will
be then silently dropped by a firewall rule.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Due to strange NFQUEUE behaviour, traffic to remote VPN (IPsec or
OpenVPN) destinations was emitted to the internet (ppp0 or red0
interface) directly if the IPS was enabled but crashed during operation.
This patch places the IPSECBLOCK and OVPNBLOCK chains before the
ones responsible for forwarding traffic into the IPS.
Thanks to Michael for his debugging effort.
Partially fixes#12257
Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Cc: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Allowing outgoing DNS traffic (destination port 53, both TCP
and UDP) to the root servers is BCP for some reasons. First,
RFC 5011 assumes resolvers are able to fetch new trust ancors
from the root servers for a certain time period in order to
do key rollovers.
Second, Unbound shows some side effects if it cannot do trust
anchor signaling (see RFC 8145) or fetch the current trust anchor,
resulting in SERVFAILs for arbitrary requests a few minutes.
There is little security implication of allowing DNS traffic
to the root servers: An attacker might abuse this for exfiltrating
data via DNS queries, but is unable to infiltrate data unless
he gains control over at least one root server instance. If
there is no firewall ruleset in place which prohibits any other
DNS traffic than to chosen DNS servers, this patch will not
have security implications at all.
The second version of this patch does not use unnecessary xargs-
call nor changes anything else not related to this issue.
Fixes#12183
Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Suggested-by: Horace Michael <horace.michael@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Previous setting was to log 10 packets per minute for each
event logging is turned on. This made debugging much harder,
as the limit was rather strict and chances of dropping a
packet without logging it were good.
This patch changes the log rate limit to 10 packets per
second per event, to avoid DoS attacks against the log file.
I plan to drop log rate limit entirely in future changes,
if a better solution for this attack vector is available.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Cc: Tim FitzGeorge <ipfr@tfitzgeorge.me.uk>
Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
When the Captive portal is enabled, the needed firewall rules are applied. But when restarting IPFire,
the rules are not applied because there is no call to do so.
Added call to captivectrl in the initscrip 'firewall'.
Fixes: #12015
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Create and use seperate iptables chain called IPS_INPUT, IPS_FORWARD and IPS_OUTPUT
to be more flexible which kind of traffic should be passed to suricata.
Reference #12062
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
If Tor is operating in relay mode, it has to open a lot of outgoing
TCP connections. These should be separated from any other outgoing
connections, as allowing _all_ outgoing traffic will be unwanted and
risky in most cases.
Thereof, Tor will be running as a dedicated user (see second patch),
allowing usage of user-based IPtables rulesets.
Partially fixes#11779.
Singed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This is a more general name for a script that will be extended
soon to do more than just add blocking rules.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
When loading the initscript of the firewall the neccessary chains for
the captive portalneed to be created.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Marx <alexander.marx@ipfire.org>
