Changes from 9.52 to 9.53:
- Read Drive Capacity fixes from Iestyn Walters.
- SET MAX ADDRESS fixes from Tom Yan <tom.ty89@gmail.com>.
- added --security-prompt-for-password to --security-help output.
- fwdownload changes from Jihoon Lee.
Best,
Matthias
Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Excerpt from 'NEWS':
"* Noteworthy changes in release 1.9 (2018-01-07) [stable]
** Bug fixes
gzip -d -S SUFFIX file.SUFFIX would fail for any upper-case byte in SUFFIX.
E.g., before, this command would fail:
$ :|gzip > kT && gzip -d -S T kT
gzip: kT: unknown suffix -- ignored
[bug present since the beginning]
When decompressing data in 'pack' format, gzip no longer mishandles
leading zeros in the end-of-block code. [bug introduced in gzip-1.6]
When converting from system-dependent time_t format to the 32-bit
unsigned MTIME format used in gzip files, if a timestamp does not
fit gzip now substitutes zero instead of the timestamp's low-order
32 bits, as per Internet RFC 1952. When converting from MTIME to
time_t format, if a timestamp does not fit gzip now warns and
substitutes the nearest in-range value instead of crashing or
silently substituting an implementation-defined value (typically,
the timestamp's low-order bits). This affects timestamps before
1970 and after 2106, and timestamps after 2038 on platforms with
32-bit signed time_t. [bug present since the beginning]
Commands implemented via shell scripts are now more consistent about
failure status. For example, 'gunzip --help >/dev/full' now
consistently exits with status 1 (error), instead of with status 2
(warning) on some platforms. [bug present since the beginning]
Support for VMS and Amiga has been removed. It was not working anyway,
and it reportedly caused file name glitches on MS-Windowsish platforms."
Best,
Matthias
Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This is no longer needed and in the telephone conference
on Dec 4th, it was decided to drop it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This didn't build and run in ages and has been removed from
the repositories quite a while ago.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This package was discontinued upstream and seems to be
a bit more lively again. However, nobody of the team
wants to maintain cacti. Therefore this is being dropped
for now.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This is EOL upstream for over ten years now and therefore
we cannot continue to support this either.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
OpenSSL Security Advisory [07 Dec 2017]
========================================
Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737)
==========================================================
Severity: Moderate
OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake then
OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you
attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit
handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()),
however due to a bug it does not work correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is
called directly. In that scenario, if the handshake fails then a fatal error
will be returned in the initial function call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is
subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object then it will
succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from
the SSL/TLS record layer.
In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present that
resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already
received a fatal error.
This issue does not affect OpenSSL 1.1.0.
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2n
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th November 2017 by David Benjamin
(Google). The fix was proposed by David Benjamin and implemented by Matt Caswell
of the OpenSSL development team.
rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
=========================================================
Severity: Low
There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect
would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks
against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work
necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline.
The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant.
However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share
the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option
since CVE-2016-0701.
This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
Note: The impact from this issue is similar to CVE-2017-3736, CVE-2017-3732
and CVE-2015-3193.
Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing a new release of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 at this time. The fix will be included in OpenSSL 1.1.0h when it
becomes available. The fix is also available in commit e502cc86d in the OpenSSL
git repository.
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2n
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 22nd November 2017 by David Benjamin
(Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. The fix was
developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.
Note
====
Support for version 1.0.1 ended on 31st December 2016. Support for versions
0.9.8 and 1.0.0 ended on 31st December 2015. Those versions are no longer
receiving security updates.
References
==========
URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20171207.txt
Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.
For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Drop support for Padlock which is not in wide usage
any more and creates some rootfile trouble every time.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This will allow us to run multiple builds on the same
system at the same time (or at least have them on disk).
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This is a very weird way to distribute sources in 2017.
Let's save the environment and stop using CDs.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Set the default operating mode to "relay" in the Tor WebUI
configuration page.
Running a Tor exit relay may cause legal trouble in some
countries and should not be the default setting to prevent
users from accidentally running an exit router.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
* bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736)
* Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Fixes CVE-2017-13089
A stack-based buffer overflow when processing chunked, encoded HTTP
responses was found in wget. By tricking an unsuspecting user into
connecting to a malicious HTTP server, an attacker could exploit
this flaw to potentially execute arbitrary code.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
