Incl. one vulnerability and several bug fixes. For full overview --> https://www.wireshark.org/docs/relnotes/wireshark-3.0.2.html .
- Disabled geoip support since libmaxminddb is not presant.
- Added dictionary in ROOTFILE to prevent "radius: Could not open file: '/usr/share/wireshark/radius/dictionary' " .
- Added CMAKE build type
- Removed profile examples and htmls completly from ROOTFILE.
Signed-off-by: Erik Kapfer <ummeegge@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This package is only compiled on x86_64 and i586 and cannot
be packaged in any of the other architectures.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
SMT can be forced on.
By default, all systems that are vulnerable to RIDL/Fallout
will have SMT disabled by default.
Systems that are not vulnerable to that will keep SMT enabled.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
While being built with user/group set to "tor", the default
configuration still contains the old username.
This patch adjusts it to the correct value. The issue was
caused by insufficient testing, which I apologise for.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
CBC ciphers are vulnerable to a bunch of attacks (being
rather academic so far) such as MAC-then-encrypt or
padding oracle.
These seem to be more serious (see
https://blog.qualys.com/technology/2019/04/22/zombie-poodle-and-goldendoodle-vulnerabilities
for further readings) which is why they should be used
for interoperability purposes only.
I plan to remove AES-CBC ciphers for the WebUI at the
end of the year, provided overall security landscape
has not changed until that.
This patch changes the WebUI cipherlist to:
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
(AES-CBC + ECDSA will be preferred over RSA for performance
reasons. As this cipher order cannot be trivially rebuilt with
OpenSSL cipher stings, it has to be hard-coded.)
All working clients will stay compatible.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
