This reverts commit a81cbf6127.
It was no longer possible to generate the root/host certificates.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
The input validation did not work in the proper way. It allways
reported "No password" when using a provider which supports token and
the token has been given.
This of course is wrong and leaded to unuseable providers.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
The CGI now requires the general-functions library, because the
get_red_interface() function is used.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
While hiding version information does not come with any _actual_
security improvements, it is generally a good thing to do so by default:
Attackers will still be able to reasonably guess or enumerate the
software version running, but need to conduct additional effort to do
so, hence more likely raising alerts and drawing attention on their
operation.
In addition, we suppress version details somewhere else in IPFire 2.x by
default, too (e. g. Unbound and Apache), so we can justify this patch by
aiming to stay consistent, I guess. :-)
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
While maintaining privacy when accessing web sites probably has never
been more important than it is today, faking Referer and User-Agent
headers is both obsolete and counterproductive:
(a) Most web sites require HTTPS, thwarting manipulation attempts to
HTTP headers in transit. Given todays' internet landscape, faking
these headers is unlikely to work for the vast majority of web
sites.
(b) It is trivial to detect faked HTTP User-Agent headers by obtaining
corresponding browser information via JavaScript. Any difference
most likely indicates (trivial) header manipulation attempts, hence
rendering this feature useless if browsers do not behave in the same
manner, which we cannot control on IPFire.
(c) Especially static Referer headers make users stick out like a sore
thumb, as nobody else in the world is likely to have the same
Referer set _all the time_.
Modern browsers attempt to strip sensitive information from Referer
headers, or ditch them completely, particularly to 3rd party sites.
Given the state of the web ecosystem as we know it today, enforcing
privacy in a centralised manner does not even come close to being
sufficient. Without gaining control over users' browsers, their
settings, and their infrastructure (such as setting up terminal
environments for accessing the web, preventing hardware
fingerprinting), a centralised attempt will at best fail, if not making
things worse, as highlighted in (c).
Therefore, removing these features from the Squid GUI is the least worse
option we have. We should not give our users a false sense of privacy.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bitsch <bbitsch@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
