https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20170126.txt
Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731)
=========================================================
Severity: Moderate
If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific
cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or client
to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.
For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using CHACHA20/POLY1305;
users should upgrade to 1.1.0d
For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users who have
not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th November 2016 by Robert Święcki of
Google. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.
Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash (CVE-2017-3730)
===========================================================
Severity: Moderate
If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key exchange
then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL pointer
leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service
attack.
OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d
This issue does not affect OpenSSL version 1.0.2.
Note that this issue was fixed prior to it being recognised as a security
concern. This means the git commit with the fix does not contain the CVE
identifier. The relevant fix commit can be identified by commit hash efbe126e3.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 14th January 2017 by Guido Vranken. The
fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.
BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732)
==================================================================
Severity: Moderate
There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No
EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA
as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not
believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very
difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information
about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources
required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only
accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very
similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.
OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2k
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 15th January 2017 by the OSS-Fuzz project.
The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.
Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
=======================================================================
Severity: Low
This issue was previously fixed in 1.1.0c and covered in security advisory
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20161110.txt
OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2k
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
These all fix a potential "NULL dereference" bug that has existed in libpng
since version 0.71 of June 26, 1995. To be vulnerable, an application
has to load a text chunk into the png structure, then delete all text, then
add another text chunk to the same png structure, which seems to be
an unlikely sequence, but it has happened.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
The previous version aborted when the validation test
suceeded, but this is not always sufficient in case a
provider filters any DNSKEY, DS or RRSIG records.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This patch always enables asynchronous logging which slows
down the system a lot on slow storage and some virtual environments.
It also removes the configuration options in the web
user interface, since this is not configurable any more.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
DNSSec need the correct time to validate the zones so we need
a workaround to init the time without dns.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
These are traditionally used for Windows domains and should not
be used for that. However if they are used like this, DNSSEC
validation cannot be used.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This reverts commit eef9b2529c.
It appears that htpasswd is not salting any passwords that are
stored with the SHA (-s) algorithm. MD5 passwords however are
salted.
That leads us to the conclusion that the "MD5 algorithm" in htpasswd
is more secure than the "SHA algorithm" although the hash function
itself should be stronger.
With a rainbow table, cracking "SHA" is easily done.
A rainbow table for "MD5" + salt would be way too large to be
efficiently stored.
Hence this commit is reverted to old behaviour to avoid the clear
failure of design in SHA.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter@ipfire.org>
This was actually changed over a year ago, but was
never shipped in an update.
Commit 212fd689a3
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This is a work around to prevent not working dns
resolution if the time jumps before the DNSSec signing key.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
htpasswd doesn't protect passwords very well. MD5 was used
before and now any newly created passwords will use the
SHA format.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
unbound does not append the local domain to the request
any more (like dnsmasq did). Therefore, the client needs
to do that if desired.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
This update removes dnsmasq and replaces it with unbound.
Also many packages are updated and shipped.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
simply adding may use id's twice if the user has
added other services so we don't update this files.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
