Enable and specify the path to the threshold-file in the suricata.yaml,
otherwise the programm is trying to read it from a build-in default
location and prints the following error message:
Error opening file: "/etc/suricata//threshold.config": No such file or directory
Fixes#11837.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Now all oinkmaster related config files and suricata
related yaml files in "/var/ipfire/suricata/" will be
included into the backups.
Also the entire ruleset is part of the backup, so after a
backup has been restored, the IDS can be used in the same way
as before.
Fixes#11835.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
This function checks if all files located in /etc/suricata/rules are
writable by the effective user and group (nobody:nobody) and if not
calls suricatactl to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Remove a lot of stuff and options which are deactivated during compiling,
unsupported by the plattform or not used in IPFire.
Add an advice to the full documented suricata-example.yaml file which also
is shipped by IPFire.
More work needs to be done.
See #11808
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
This generic function can be used to create any kind of emtpy files -
it just requires the full path and filename to work.
If the specified file exists at calltime, the function will abort
to prevent from overwriting existing files and content.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
This is done at boot time and doesn't normally need to be done again.
On AWS or in the setup, renaming any network interfaces is being
handled automatically.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Ship an IPFire specific configuration file for oinkmaster.
This allows oinkmaster to do all the great rule modifications which
have been introduced by the new ids.cgi file.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
The third version of this patch superseds the first and
second one which were broken due to bugs in the MUAs GPG
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@link38.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Hi,
Fixes#11816
(https://bugzilla.ipfire.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11816 and
https://bugzilla.ipfire.org/attachment.cgi?id=608):
"[root@ipfire ~]# backupctrl exclude
...
tar: The following options were used after any non-optional arguments in
archive create or update mode. These options are positional and affect
only arguments that follow them. Please, rearrange them properly.
tar: --exclude-from '/var/ipfire/backup/exclude.user' has no effect
tar: Exiting with failure status due to previous errors"
Please test - I got no errors anymore.
Best,
Matthias
Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [14 Aug 2018]
*) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
(CVE-2018-0732)
[Guido Vranken]
*) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
(CVE-2018-0737)
[Billy Brumley]
*) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
to 2^-128.
[Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
*) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
[Matt Caswell]
*) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
are no longer allowed.
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS
Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
[Matt Caswell]
Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018]
*) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
(CVE-2018-0732)
[Guido Vranken]
*) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
(CVE-2018-0737)
[Billy Brumley]
*) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
to 2^-128.
[Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
*) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
[Matt Caswell]
*) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
are no longer allowed.
[Emilia Käsper]
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
