i had disabled CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY because this
fails to compile on riscv64.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
From the kernel documentation:
> Driver for the internal USB role switch for switching the USB data
> lines between the xHCI host controller and the dwc3 gadget controller
> found on various Intel SoCs. [...]
This may unblock USB-LAN-adaptor usage on certain boards, as reported
once in #12750. Overall affected devices seem to be scanty;
nevertheless, enabling this as a module only is highly unlikely to cause
any harm, so let's give it a try.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Compiling the kernel has automatically introduced
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y and removed GCC's structleak plugin (not to
be confused with its stackleak counterpart). However, according to
related documentation, this neither introduces a security nor
performance disadvantage.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This removes support for building IPFire for 32 bit ARM architectures.
This has been decided in August 2022 with six months notice as there are
not very many users and hardware is generally not available any more.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
It does not generate cryptographically secure entropy.
Backported from IPFire 3.x as 6aea180b26906f001611dcc0c54f494818069d8c.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This patch also compiles all sorts of device mapper stuff as modules.
Backported from IPFire 3.x as 6fe31a44d07d8705ca7713c449ccbb3dbb9684a0.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This is disabled in IPFire 3.x, and projects such as grsecurity
recommend doing so for security reasons as well. Also, skimming through
our source code, there is no point where this ACPI configfs would have
been explicitly mounted, which leads to the assumption that we never
used it anyway.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
From the kernel's documentation:
> Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
> themselves (and their future children) by gradually enforcing
> tailored access control policies. A Landlock security policy is a
> set of access rights (e.g. open a file in read-only, make a
> directory, etc.) tied to a file hierarchy. Such policy can be
> configured and enforced by any processes for themselves using the
> dedicated system calls: landlock_create_ruleset(),
> landlock_add_rule(), and landlock_restrict_self().
There is no harm in enabling this security feature, so applications
supporting Landlock can benefit from it.
Rolled forward from https://patchwork.ipfire.org/project/ipfire/patch/d7ac0caf-5a7c-bcca-6293-16c773523942@ipfire.org/
to submit all kernel-related changes as a single patchset.
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
This change enables support for NXP's QorIQ/Layerscape platforms,
specifically the Traverse Technologies Ten64 (LS1088A).
Signed-off-by: Mathew McBride <matt@traverse.com.au>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Since last time we checked, the kernel's security features on ARM have
improved notably (see CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE discussion). This patch
therefore proposes to give the seccomp filter on both 32- and 64-bit ARM
another try, since it provides significant security benefit to
applications using it.
Due to operational constraints, rootfile changes have been omitted, and
will be conducted, should this patch be approved.
Note to future self: Once this patch is approved, applications using
seccomp (OpenSSH, Tor) need to be updated/shipped on ARM.
Fixes: #12366Fixes: #12370
Cc: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
From the kernels' documentation:
> Uprobes is the user-space counterpart to kprobes: they
> enable instrumentation applications (such as 'perf probe')
> to establish unintrusive probes in user-space binaries and
> libraries, by executing handler functions when the probes
> are hit by user-space applications.
>
> ( These probes come in the form of single-byte breakpoints,
> managed by the kernel and kept transparent to the probed
> application. )
To the best of the authors' understanding, no application on IPFire
needs this functionality, and given its abuse potential, we should
probably not enable it.
As expected, strace functionality is not impaired by this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
According to the kernel's documentation,
> debugfs is a virtual file system that kernel developers use to put
> debugging files into. Enable this option to be able to read and
> write to these files.
There is no legitimate reason why one has to do so on an IPFire machine.
Further, the vast debugging options (i.e. related to various drivers)
have never been enabled, limiting the use of this virtual file system
even further.
This patch therefore proposes to disable it entirely, since its
potential security impact outweights its benefits. Due to operational
constraints, changes to ARM kernel configurations will be made if this
patch is approved for x86_64.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
From the kernel documentation:
> For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
> merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
> This carries a risk of kernel heap overflows being able to
> overwrite objects from merged caches (and more easily control
> cache layout), which makes such heap attacks easier to exploit
> by attackers. By keeping caches unmerged, these kinds of exploits
> can usually only damage objects in the same cache. [...]
Thus, it is more sane to leave slab merging disabled. KSPP and ClipOS
recommend this as well.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
