They were mistakenly placed after the IPS chains in commit
7b529f5417, but should be placed after the
connection tracking and before the IPS.
Fixes: #12815
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
It is not necessary to have this key present on IPFire systems anymore,
since it has not been in use for years, and we can expect systems to be
sufficiently up-to-date, so they no longer need to rely on old updates
or add-ons signed with this key.
Also, given the current key was generated in 2018, we should consider a
Pakfire key rollover soon.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
The current setup can fail and block all traffic on RED if the RETURN
rules could not be created.
This can happen when the kernel fails to load the ipset module, as it is
the case after upgrading to a new kernel. Restarting the firewall will
cause that the system is being cut off the internet.
This design now changes that if those rules cannot be created, the
DROP_HOSTILE feature is just inactive, but it would not disrupt any
traffic.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Weismüller <daniel.weismueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
The DHCP server can instruct clients to configure a certain MTU.
This used to be done by setting the MTU of the interface. However,
dhcpcd has changed this behaviour using routes to.
We used to have a modified version of the old mechanism which no longer
works well with the new system and is therefore to be dropped.
This is the first commit in the series implementing the new behaviour
and telling dhcpcd to use the configured MTU.
Fixes: #12563
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Terraform only supports sending any shell scripts encoded in base64
which is however not required by Oracle. Therefore we have to test if
the script is encoded or not.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
pool.ipfire.org cannot resolved. Now try both default dns
servers. If one works dns is working.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
In theory, logging of dropped packets classified by conntrack as being
INVALID should never be disabled, since one wants to have a paper trail
of what his/her firewall is doing.
However, conntrack seems to drop a lot of (at the first glance
legitimate) packets, hence bloating the logs, making spotting the
important firewall hits more difficult.
This patch therefore adds the option to disable logging of packets being
dropped by conntrack due to INVALID state.
Please note:
- This patch does not add this category to the firewall hits graph.
- The variables in this patch ("LOGDROPCTINVALID") should make it clear
that it is about toggling _logging_, not the actual _dropping_. Other
variables are still in need of being renamed to clarify this, which
will be done in a dedicated patch.
- Also, the changes made to update.sh need to take place in
config/rootfiles/core/164/update.sh for "master", since this patch has
been developed against "next". Kindly cherry-pick the necessary
changes.
Partially fixes: #12778
Reported-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Bumping across one of our scripts with very long trailing whitespaces, I
thought it might be a good idea to clean these up. Doing so, some
missing or inconsistent licence headers were fixed.
There is no need in shipping all these files en bloc, as their
functionality won't change.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
In theory, logging of dropped packets classified by conntrack as being
INVALID should never be disabled, since one wants to have a paper trail
of what his/her firewall is doing.
However, conntrack seems to drop a lot of (at the first glance
legitimate) packets, hence bloating the logs, making spotting the
important firewall hits more difficult.
This patch therefore adds the option to disable logging of packets being
dropped by conntrack due to INVALID state.
Please note:
- This patch does not add this category to the firewall hits graph.
- The variables in this patch ("LOGDROPCTINVALID") should make it clear
that it is about toggling _logging_, not the actual _dropping_. Other
variables are still in need of being renamed to clarify this, which
will be done in a dedicated patch.
- Also, the changes made to update.sh need to take place in
config/rootfiles/core/164/update.sh for "master", since this patch has
been developed against "next". Kindly cherry-pick the necessary
changes.
Partially fixes: #12778
Reported-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
If the firewall is talking to itself using one of its private IP
addresses (e.g. the primary green interface IP address), it will use the
loopback interface.
This is due to the local routing table which will be looked up first:
[root@ipfire ~]# ip rule
0: from all lookup local
128: from all lookup 220
220: from all lookup 220
32765: from all lookup static
32766: from all lookup main
32767: from all lookup default
It contains:
[root@ipfire ~]# ip route show table local
local 8x.1x.1x.1x dev ppp0 proto kernel scope host src 8x.1x.1x.1x
local 127.0.0.0/8 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1
local 127.0.0.1 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1
broadcast 127.255.255.255 dev lo proto kernel scope link src 127.0.0.1
local 192.168.x.1 dev green0 proto kernel scope host src 192.168.x.1
broadcast 192.168.x.255 dev green0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.x.1
Any lookup for the green IP address will show this:
local 192.168.x.1 dev lo table local src 192.168.x.1 uid 0
cache <local>
A test ping shows this in tcpdump:
[root@ipfire ~]# tcpdump -i any icmp -nn
tcpdump: data link type LINUX_SLL2
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode
listening on any, link-type LINUX_SLL2 (Linux cooked v2), snapshot length 262144 bytes
17:24:22.864293 lo In IP 127.0.0.1 > 127.0.0.1: ICMP echo request, id 10420, seq 1, length 64
17:24:22.864422 lo In IP 127.0.0.1 > 127.0.0.1: ICMP echo reply, id 10420, seq 1, length 64
17:24:29.162021 lo In IP 192.168.x.1 > 192.168.x.1: ICMP echo request, id 1555, seq 1, length 64
17:24:29.162201 lo In IP 192.168.x.1 > 192.168.x.1: ICMP echo reply, id 1555, seq 1, length 64
For this reason, we will have to accept any source and destination IP
address on the loopback interface, which is what this patch does.
We can however, continue to check whether we received any packets with
the loopback address on any other interface.
This regression was introduced in commit a36cd34e.
Fixes: #12776 - New spoofed or martian filter block
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
If the firewall is talking to itself using one of its private IP
addresses (e.g. the primary green interface IP address), it will use the
loopback interface.
This is due to the local routing table which will be looked up first:
[root@ipfire ~]# ip rule
0: from all lookup local
128: from all lookup 220
220: from all lookup 220
32765: from all lookup static
32766: from all lookup main
32767: from all lookup default
It contains:
[root@ipfire ~]# ip route show table local
local 8x.1x.1x.1x dev ppp0 proto kernel scope host src 8x.1x.1x.1x
local 127.0.0.0/8 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1
local 127.0.0.1 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1
broadcast 127.255.255.255 dev lo proto kernel scope link src 127.0.0.1
local 192.168.x.1 dev green0 proto kernel scope host src 192.168.x.1
broadcast 192.168.x.255 dev green0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.x.1
Any lookup for the green IP address will show this:
local 192.168.x.1 dev lo table local src 192.168.x.1 uid 0
cache <local>
A test ping shows this in tcpdump:
[root@ipfire ~]# tcpdump -i any icmp -nn
tcpdump: data link type LINUX_SLL2
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode
listening on any, link-type LINUX_SLL2 (Linux cooked v2), snapshot length 262144 bytes
17:24:22.864293 lo In IP 127.0.0.1 > 127.0.0.1: ICMP echo request, id 10420, seq 1, length 64
17:24:22.864422 lo In IP 127.0.0.1 > 127.0.0.1: ICMP echo reply, id 10420, seq 1, length 64
17:24:29.162021 lo In IP 192.168.x.1 > 192.168.x.1: ICMP echo request, id 1555, seq 1, length 64
17:24:29.162201 lo In IP 192.168.x.1 > 192.168.x.1: ICMP echo reply, id 1555, seq 1, length 64
For this reason, we will have to accept any source and destination IP
address on the loopback interface, which is what this patch does.
We can however, continue to check whether we received any packets with
the loopback address on any other interface.
This regression was introduced in commit a36cd34e.
Fixes: #12776 - New spoofed or martian filter block
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
this fix MAC address generation on R2S
and allow to use the new added overclocked dtb's for R2S and R4S.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
For some reason, this module is not present after the very first boot of
an IPFire installation.
Fixes: #12767
Reported-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
-update arm-trusted firmware to 2.6
-fix mac address generation on R2S because the CPUID fuses are not uniqe
-add support for NanoPi R4S
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Similar to the Location block, this chain logs and drops all traffic
from and to networks known to pose technical threats to IPFire users.
Doing so in a dedicated chain makes sense for transparency reasons, as
we won't interfer with other firewall rules or the Location block, so it
is always clear why a packet from or to such a network has been dropped.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
There is no legitimate reason why traffic from our own IP address on RED
should ever appear incoming on that interface.
This prevents attackers from impersonating IPFire itself, and is only
cleared/reset if the RED interface is brought up. Therefore, an attacker
cannot bypass this by foring a dial-up or DHCP connection to break down.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Traffic from and to 127.0.0.0/8 must only appear on the loopback
interface, never on any other interface. This ensures offending packets
are logged, and the loopback interface cannot be abused for processing
traffic from and to any other networks.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Inbound Tor traffic conflicts with Location block as inbound connections
have to be accepted from many parts of the world. To solve this,
inbound Tor traffic has to be accepted before jumping into Location block
chain.
Note this affects Tor relay operators only.
Rolled forward as ongoing from
https://patchwork.ipfire.org/project/ipfire/patch/f8ee2e1d-b642-8c63-1f8a-4f24c354cd90@ipfire.org/,
note the documentation in the wiki needs to be updated once this landed
in production.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
In case of faulty connection tracking, this ensures such packets are
logged, to make analysing network incidents less troublesome. Since
NewNotSYN is handled before, where logging can be turned off for systems
running on weak flash devices, the amount of log messages emitted here
should be neglectible.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
This patch removes support for i586 according to the decision being
taken over a year ago.
It removes the architecture from the build system and removes all
required hacks and other quirks that have been necessary before.
There is no need to ship any changed files to the remaining
architectures as the removed code branches have not been used.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
if the system time is incorrect DNSSec validation fail but it fails sometimes for pool.ntp.org already but not for ping.ipfire.org.
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
pppd 2.4.9 supports IPv6 and asks for an IPv6 configuration by default.
Setting the received prefix in the kernel will never work, however, as
the rest of IPFire 2.x does not support IPv6.
pppd notices the ISP about this, and at least Otenet (GR) and British
Telecom (several countries) decide to close a dial-up connection then.
German DTAG seems to ignore such errors silently.
This patch adds an option to the pppd call to prevent asking for an
IPv6 configuration, hence avoiding this errors.
To apply this patch, it is necessary to ship ppp 2.4.9 again. Since I
have no access to a testing machine behind an ISP supporting IPv6, this
patch unfortunately is untested.
Fixes: #12651
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
NFQUEUE does not let the packet continue where it was processed, but
inserts it back into iptables at the start. That is why we need an
extra IPSBYPASS chain which has the following tasks:
* Make the BYPASS bit permanent for the entire connection
* Clear the REPEAT bit
The latter is more of cosmetic nature so that we can identify packets
that have come from suricata again and those which have bypassed the IPS
straight away.
The IPS_* chain will now only be sent traffic to, when none of the two
relevant bits has been set. Otherwise the packet has already been
processed by suricata in the first pass or suricata has decided to
bypass the connection.
This massively reduces load on the IPS which allows many common
connections (TLS connections with downloads) to bypass the IPS bringing
us back to line speed.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Tested-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
