On November 30, 2022, Mozilla decided to take the following
actions as a response to the concerns raised about the merits
of this root CA operator (excerpt taken from
https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/oxX69KFvsm4/m/yLohoVqtCgAJ):
> 1. Set "Distrust for TLS After Date" and "Distrust for S/MIME
> After Date" to November 30, 2022, for the 3 TrustCor root
> certificates (TrustCor RootCert CA-1, TrustCor ECA-1,
> TrustCor RootCert CA-2) that are currently included in
> Mozilla's root store.
>
> 2. Remove those root certificates from Mozilla's root store
> after the existing end-entity TLS certificates have expired.
As far as the latter is concerned, the offending certificates
have these expiry dates set:
- TrustCor RootCert CA-1: Mon, 31 Dec 2029 17:23:16 GMT
- TrustCor RootCert CA-2: Sun, 31 Dec 2034 17:26:39 GMT
- TrustCor ECA-1: Mon, 31 Dec 2029 17:28:07 GMT
The way IPFire 2 currently processes Mozilla's trust store
does not feature a way of incorporate a "Distrust for XYZ After
Date" attribute. This means that despite TrustCor Systems root
CAs are no longer trusted by browsers using Mozilla's trust
store, IPFire would still accept certificates directly or
indirectly issued by this CA until December 2029 or December 2034.
To protect IPFire users, this patch therefore suggests to
patch our copy of Mozilla's trust store in order to remove
TrustCor Systems' root CAs: The vast majority of HTTPS connections
established from an IPFire machine take place in a non-interactive
context, so there is no security benefit from a "Distrust After
Date" information. Instead, if we do not want IPFire installations
to trust this CA, we have no other option other than remove it
unilaterally from our copy of Mozilla's trust store.
See also: https://lists.ipfire.org/pipermail/development/2022-November/014681.html
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Historically, the MD5 checksums in our LFS files serve as a protection
against broken downloads, or accidentally corrupted source files.
While the sources are nowadays downloaded via HTTPS, it make sense to
beef up integrity protection for them, since transparently intercepting
TLS is believed to be feasible for more powerful actors, and the state
of the public PKI ecosystem is clearly not helping.
Therefore, this patch switches from MD5 to BLAKE2, updating all LFS
files as well as make.sh to deal with this checksum algorithm. BLAKE2 is
notably faster (and more secure) than SHA2, so the performance penalty
introduced by this patch is negligible, if noticeable at all.
In preparation of this patch, the toolchain files currently used have
been supplied with BLAKE2 checksums as well on
https://source.ipfire.org/.
Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremeripfire.org>
Bumping across one of our scripts with very long trailing whitespaces, I
thought it might be a good idea to clean these up. Doing so, some
missing or inconsistent licence headers were fixed.
There is no need in shipping all these files en bloc, as their
functionality won't change.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
- Implement python3 version of certdata2pem.py script from fedora
- Modify build.sh to work with python3 script that uses p11-kit based on fedora
approach - https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/ca-certificates/tree/rawhide
- Extraction of cert files now uses p11-kit which requires libtasn1 as a build
dependency
- Updated rootfile
- Updated ca-certificates installed into a vm and confirmed to download a file from an
https site with the same results as with existing ca-certfictaes system
Tested-by: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
