mirror of
https://github.com/vincentmli/bpfire.git
synced 2026-05-01 07:50:23 +02:00
misc-progs: Convert to right file encoding.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Tremer
@@ -1,155 +1,156 @@
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/* This file is part of the IPCop Firewall.
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*
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* IPCop is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* IPCop is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with IPCop; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2003-04-22 Robert Kerr <rkerr@go.to>
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*
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* $Id: setuid.c,v 1.2.2.1 2005/11/18 14:51:43 franck78 Exp $
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <sys/resource.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <glob.h>
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#include "setuid.h"
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#ifndef OPEN_MAX
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#define OPEN_MAX 256
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#endif
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/* Trusted environment for executing commands */
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char * trusted_env[4]={
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"PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/bin",
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"SHELL=/bin/sh",
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"TERM=dumb",
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NULL};
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/* Spawns a child process that uses /bin/sh to interpret a command.
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* This is much the same in use and purpose as system(), yet as it uses execve
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* to pass a trusted environment it's immune to attacks based upon changing
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* IFS, ENV, BASH_ENV and other such variables.
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* Note this does NOT guard against any other attacks, inparticular you MUST
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* validate the command you are passing. If the command is formed from user
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* input be sure to check this input is what you expect. Nasty things can
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* happen if a user can inject ; or `` into your command for example */
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int safe_system(char* command)
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{
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return system_core( command, 0, 0, "safe_system" );
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}
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/* Much like safe_system but lets you specify a non-root uid and gid to run
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* the command as */
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int unpriv_system(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
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{
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return system_core(command, uid, gid, "unpriv_system" );
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}
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int system_core(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error)
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{
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int pid, status;
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if(!command)
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return 1;
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switch( pid = fork() )
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{
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case -1:
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return -1;
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case 0: /* child */
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{
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char * argv[4];
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if (gid && setgid(gid))
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{
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fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
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perror("Couldn't setgid");
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exit(127);
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}
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if (uid && setuid(uid))
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{
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fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
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perror("Couldn't setuid");
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exit(127);
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}
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argv[0] = "sh";
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argv[1] = "-c";
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argv[2] = command;
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argv[3] = NULL;
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execve("/bin/sh", argv, trusted_env);
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fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
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perror("execve failed");
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exit(127);
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}
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default: /* parent */
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do {
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if( waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1 ) {
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if( errno != EINTR )
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return -1;
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} else
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return status;
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} while (1);
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}
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}
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/* General routine to initialise a setuid root program, and put the
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* environment in a known state. Returns 1 on success, if initsetuid() returns
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* 0 then you should exit(1) immediately, DON'T attempt to recover from the
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* error */
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int initsetuid(void)
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{
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int fds,i;
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struct stat st;
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struct rlimit rlim;
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/* Prevent signal tricks by ignoring all except SIGKILL and SIGCHILD */
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for( i = 0; i < NSIG; i++ ) {
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if( i != SIGKILL && i != SIGCHLD )
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signal(i, SIG_IGN);
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}
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/* dump all non-standard file descriptors (a full descriptor table could
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* lead to DoS by preventing us opening files) */
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if ((fds = getdtablesize()) == -1) fds = OPEN_MAX;
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for( i = 3; i < fds; i++ ) close(i);
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/* check stdin, stdout & stderr are open before going any further */
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for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ )
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if( fstat(i, &st) == -1 && ((errno != EBADF) || (close(i), open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != i ))
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return 0;
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/* disable core dumps in case we're processing sensitive information */
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rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
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if(setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim))
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{ perror("Couldn't disable core dumps"); return 0; }
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/* drop any supplementary groups, set uid & gid to root */
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if (setgroups(0, NULL)) { perror("Couldn't clear group list"); return 0; }
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if (setgid(0)) { perror("Couldn't setgid(0)"); return 0; }
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if (setuid(0)) { perror("Couldn't setuid(0)"); return 0; }
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return 1;
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}
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/* This file is part of the IPCop Firewall.
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*
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* IPCop is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* IPCop is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with IPCop; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2003-04-22 Robert Kerr <rkerr@go.to>
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*
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* $Id: setuid.c,v 1.2.2.1 2005/11/18 14:51:43 franck78 Exp $
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <sys/resource.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <glob.h>
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#include "setuid.h"
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#ifndef OPEN_MAX
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#define OPEN_MAX 256
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#endif
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/* Trusted environment for executing commands */
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char * trusted_env[4] = {
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"PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/bin",
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"SHELL=/bin/sh",
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"TERM=dumb",
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NULL
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};
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/* Spawns a child process that uses /bin/sh to interpret a command.
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* This is much the same in use and purpose as system(), yet as it uses execve
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* to pass a trusted environment it's immune to attacks based upon changing
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* IFS, ENV, BASH_ENV and other such variables.
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* Note this does NOT guard against any other attacks, inparticular you MUST
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* validate the command you are passing. If the command is formed from user
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* input be sure to check this input is what you expect. Nasty things can
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* happen if a user can inject ; or `` into your command for example */
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int safe_system(char* command)
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{
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return system_core( command, 0, 0, "safe_system" );
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}
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/* Much like safe_system but lets you specify a non-root uid and gid to run
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* the command as */
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int unpriv_system(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
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{
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return system_core(command, uid, gid, "unpriv_system" );
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}
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int system_core(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error)
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{
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int pid, status;
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if(!command)
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return 1;
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switch( pid = fork() )
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{
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case -1:
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return -1;
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case 0: /* child */
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{
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char * argv[4];
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if (gid && setgid(gid))
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{
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fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
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perror("Couldn't setgid");
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exit(127);
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}
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if (uid && setuid(uid))
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{
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fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
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perror("Couldn't setuid");
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exit(127);
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}
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argv[0] = "sh";
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argv[1] = "-c";
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argv[2] = command;
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argv[3] = NULL;
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execve("/bin/sh", argv, trusted_env);
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fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
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perror("execve failed");
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exit(127);
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}
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default: /* parent */
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do {
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if( waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1 ) {
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if( errno != EINTR )
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return -1;
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} else
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return status;
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} while (1);
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}
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}
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/* General routine to initialise a setuid root program, and put the
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* environment in a known state. Returns 1 on success, if initsetuid() returns
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* 0 then you should exit(1) immediately, DON'T attempt to recover from the
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* error */
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int initsetuid(void)
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{
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int fds,i;
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struct stat st;
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struct rlimit rlim;
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/* Prevent signal tricks by ignoring all except SIGKILL and SIGCHILD */
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for( i = 0; i < NSIG; i++ ) {
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if( i != SIGKILL && i != SIGCHLD )
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signal(i, SIG_IGN);
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}
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/* dump all non-standard file descriptors (a full descriptor table could
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* lead to DoS by preventing us opening files) */
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if ((fds = getdtablesize()) == -1) fds = OPEN_MAX;
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for( i = 3; i < fds; i++ ) close(i);
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/* check stdin, stdout & stderr are open before going any further */
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for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ )
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if( fstat(i, &st) == -1 && ((errno != EBADF) || (close(i), open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != i ))
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return 0;
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/* disable core dumps in case we're processing sensitive information */
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rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
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if(setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim))
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{ perror("Couldn't disable core dumps"); return 0; }
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/* drop any supplementary groups, set uid & gid to root */
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if (setgroups(0, NULL)) { perror("Couldn't clear group list"); return 0; }
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if (setgid(0)) { perror("Couldn't setgid(0)"); return 0; }
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if (setuid(0)) { perror("Couldn't setuid(0)"); return 0; }
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return 1;
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}
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