From 8368c32cb69da82c8df36404ec8042c3046866ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 22:46:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 01/40] CVE-2015-5370: dcerpc.idl: add
 DCERPC_{NCACN_PAYLOAD,FRAG}_MAX_SIZE defines
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
---
 librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl b/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl
index 75ef2ec..bbb42d1 100644
--- a/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl
+++ b/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl
@@ -475,9 +475,11 @@ interface dcerpc
 	const uint8 DCERPC_PFC_OFFSET      =  3;
 	const uint8 DCERPC_DREP_OFFSET     =  4;
 	const uint8 DCERPC_FRAG_LEN_OFFSET =  8;
+	const uint32 DCERPC_FRAG_MAX_SIZE  = 5840;
 	const uint8 DCERPC_AUTH_LEN_OFFSET = 10;
 	const uint8 DCERPC_CALL_ID_OFFSET  = 12;
 	const uint8 DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_OFFSET = 16;
+	const uint32 DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE = 0x400000; /* 4 MByte */
 
 	/* little-endian flag */
 	const uint8 DCERPC_DREP_LE  = 0x10;
-- 
2.8.1


From e3043ba5aafdb0605ab14b11917d497b59d82bec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2015 01:19:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 02/40] CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: simplify and harden
 dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
---
 librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h  |  4 +--
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
index 97ef798..f936ef4 100644
--- a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+++ b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
@@ -92,31 +92,44 @@ uint8_t dcerpc_get_endian_flag(DATA_BLOB *blob)
 *
 * @return		- A NTSTATUS error code.
 */
-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-				  DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
+				  const DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
 				  struct dcerpc_auth *auth,
-				  uint32_t *auth_length,
+				  uint32_t *_auth_length,
 				  bool auth_data_only)
 {
 	struct ndr_pull *ndr;
 	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
-	uint32_t data_and_pad;
+	uint16_t data_and_pad;
+	uint16_t auth_length;
+	uint32_t tmp_length;
 
-	data_and_pad = pkt_trailer->length
-			- (DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH + pkt->auth_length);
+	ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
+	if (_auth_length != NULL) {
+		*_auth_length = 0;
+	}
 
-	/* paranoia check for pad size. This would be caught anyway by
-	   the ndr_pull_advance() a few lines down, but it scared
-	   Jeremy enough for him to call me, so we might as well check
-	   it now, just to prevent someone posting a bogus YouTube
-	   video in the future.
-	*/
-	if (data_and_pad > pkt_trailer->length) {
-		return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+	/* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
+	if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	tmp_length = DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_OFFSET;
+	tmp_length += DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH;
+	tmp_length += pkt->auth_length;
+	if (tmp_length > pkt->frag_length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (pkt_trailer->length > UINT16_MAX) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	}
 
-	*auth_length = pkt_trailer->length - data_and_pad;
+	auth_length = DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH + pkt->auth_length;
+	if (pkt_trailer->length < auth_length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	data_and_pad = pkt_trailer->length - auth_length;
 
 	ndr = ndr_pull_init_blob(pkt_trailer, mem_ctx);
 	if (!ndr) {
@@ -136,14 +149,28 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 	ndr_err = ndr_pull_dcerpc_auth(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS, auth);
 	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
 		talloc_free(ndr);
+		ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
 		return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
 	}
 
+	if (data_and_pad < auth->auth_pad_length) {
+		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": ERROR: pad length mismatch. "
+			  "Calculated %u  got %u\n",
+			  (unsigned)data_and_pad,
+			  (unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
+		talloc_free(ndr);
+		ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
 	if (auth_data_only && data_and_pad != auth->auth_pad_length) {
-		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": WARNING: pad length mismatch. "
+		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": ERROR: pad length mismatch. "
 			  "Calculated %u  got %u\n",
 			  (unsigned)data_and_pad,
 			  (unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
+		talloc_free(ndr);
+		ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 	}
 
 	DEBUG(6,(__location__ ": auth_pad_length %u\n",
@@ -152,6 +179,10 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 	talloc_steal(mem_ctx, auth->credentials.data);
 	talloc_free(ndr);
 
+	if (_auth_length != NULL) {
+		*_auth_length = auth_length;
+	}
+
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
 
diff --git a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
index fe8129d..98a2e95 100644
--- a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
+++ b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
@@ -158,9 +158,9 @@ uint8_t dcerpc_get_endian_flag(DATA_BLOB *blob);
 *
 * @return		- A NTSTATUS error code.
 */
-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 				  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-				  DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
+				  const DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
 				  struct dcerpc_auth *auth,
 				  uint32_t *auth_length,
 				  bool auth_data_only);
-- 
2.8.1


From 397300d996299400842938131691fbbeb88c2c82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 10:24:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 03/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: don't call
 dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() if auth_length is 0
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

All other paranoia checks are done within dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
now.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 12 ++----------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
index 24f2f52..76f2acc 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
@@ -899,16 +899,8 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
 	}
 
-	/* Paranioa checks for auth_length. */
-	if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
-		return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
-	}
-	if (((unsigned int)pkt->auth_length
-	     + DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH < (unsigned int)pkt->auth_length) ||
-	    ((unsigned int)pkt->auth_length
-	     + DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH < DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH)) {
-		/* Integer wrap attempt. */
-		return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
 	}
 
 	status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt, pkt_trailer,
-- 
2.8.1


From faa20091b4a456a5e29f852561f6f5e9863860e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 08:10:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 04/40] CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: add a
 dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() helper function
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8266be48f455a5e541d0f7f62a1c8c38e0835976)
---
 librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h  |  5 ++++
 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+)

diff --git a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
index f936ef4..2f599d5 100644
--- a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+++ b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
@@ -186,6 +186,79 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
 
+/**
+* @brief	Verify the fields in ncacn_packet header.
+*
+* @param pkt		- The ncacn_packet strcuture
+* @param ptype		- The expected PDU type
+* @param max_auth_info	- The maximum size of a possible auth trailer
+* @param required_flags	- The required flags for the pdu.
+* @param optional_flags	- The possible optional flags for the pdu.
+*
+* @return		- A NTSTATUS error code.
+*/
+NTSTATUS dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+					   enum dcerpc_pkt_type ptype,
+					   size_t max_auth_info,
+					   uint8_t required_flags,
+					   uint8_t optional_flags)
+{
+	if (pkt->rpc_vers != 5) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (pkt->rpc_vers_minor != 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (pkt->ptype != ptype) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (max_auth_info > UINT16_MAX) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (pkt->auth_length > 0) {
+		size_t max_auth_length;
+
+		if (max_auth_info <= DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH) {
+			return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+		}
+		max_auth_length = max_auth_info - DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH;
+
+		if (pkt->auth_length > max_auth_length) {
+			return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((pkt->pfc_flags & required_flags) != required_flags) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (pkt->pfc_flags & ~(optional_flags|required_flags)) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (pkt->drep[0] & ~DCERPC_DREP_LE) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (pkt->drep[1] != 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (pkt->drep[2] != 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (pkt->drep[3] != 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
 struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state {
 #if 0
 	struct {
diff --git a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
index 98a2e95..b3ae5b2 100644
--- a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
+++ b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
@@ -164,6 +164,11 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 				  struct dcerpc_auth *auth,
 				  uint32_t *auth_length,
 				  bool auth_data_only);
+NTSTATUS dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+					   enum dcerpc_pkt_type ptype,
+					   size_t max_auth_info,
+					   uint8_t required_flags,
+					   uint8_t optional_flags);
 struct tevent_req *dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 						 struct tevent_context *ev,
 						 struct tstream_context *stream);
-- 
2.8.1


From c176174588c1119a11066b6188ac50cd3c9603f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 05/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: move AS/U hack to the top
 of cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 665b874b6022bfcdec3f13a9f5a844e5d1784aba)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 5ddabb7..295b88f 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -414,6 +414,19 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 	 */
 	*rdata = *pdu;
 
+	if ((pkt->ptype == DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK) &&
+	    !(pkt->pfc_flags & DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST)) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do we still need this hack which was introduced
+		 * in commit a42afcdcc7ab9aa9ed193ae36d3dbb10843447f0.
+		 *
+		 * I don't even know what AS/U might be...
+		 */
+		DEBUG(5, (__location__ ": bug in server (AS/U?), setting "
+			  "fragment first/last ON.\n"));
+		pkt->pfc_flags |= DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST | DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST;
+	}
+
 	/* Ensure we have the correct type. */
 	switch (pkt->ptype) {
 	case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP:
@@ -518,17 +531,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 	}
 
-	/* Do this just before return - we don't want to modify any rpc header
-	   data before now as we may have needed to do cryptographic actions on
-	   it before. */
-
-	if ((pkt->ptype == DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK) &&
-	    !(pkt->pfc_flags & DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST)) {
-		DEBUG(5, (__location__ ": bug in server (AS/U?), setting "
-			  "fragment first/last ON.\n"));
-		pkt->pfc_flags |= DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST | DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST;
-	}
-
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
 
-- 
2.8.1


From b9ae0068be4dfc6f7d09144c353689ab01955b93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: remove useless
 frag_length check in rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

dcerpc_pull_ncacn_packet() already verifies this.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9a3f045244b12ff9f77d2664396137c390042297)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 295b88f..2787fbc 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -898,14 +898,6 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (state->incoming_frag.length != state->pkt->frag_length) {
-		DEBUG(5, ("Incorrect pdu length %u, expected %u\n",
-			  (unsigned int)state->incoming_frag.length,
-			  (unsigned int)state->pkt->frag_length));
-		tevent_req_nterror(req,  NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
-		return;
-	}
-
 	status = cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(state,
 						state->cli, state->pkt,
 						&state->incoming_frag,
-- 
2.8.1


From 05688274f03e6086e3ba4d7b4cb4409f9c4d9cb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 08:10:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 07/40] CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: no authentication is
 indicated by pkt->auth_length == 0
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

pkt->u.*.auth_info.length is not the correct thing to check.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(packported from commit c0236de09e542dbb168969d8ae9f0c150a75198e)
---
 source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
index 1e6aa24..61f2176 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_bind(struct dcesrv_call_state *call)
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	uint32_t auth_length;
 
-	if (pkt->u.bind.auth_info.length == 0) {
+	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
 		dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info = NULL;
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_bind_ack(struct dcesrv_call_state *call, struct ncacn_packe
 	struct dcesrv_connection *dce_conn = call->conn;
 	NTSTATUS status;
 
-	if (!call->conn->auth_state.gensec_security) {
+	if (call->pkt.auth_length == 0) {
 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
 	}
 
@@ -155,10 +155,16 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_auth3(struct dcesrv_call_state *call)
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	uint32_t auth_length;
 
-	/* We can't work without an existing gensec state, and an new blob to feed it */
-	if (!dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info ||
-	    !dce_conn->auth_state.gensec_security ||
-	    pkt->u.auth3.auth_info.length == 0) {
+	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* We can't work without an existing gensec state */
+	if (!dce_conn->auth_state.gensec_security) {
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -203,7 +209,7 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_alter(struct dcesrv_call_state *call)
 	uint32_t auth_length;
 
 	/* on a pure interface change there is no auth blob */
-	if (pkt->u.alter.auth_info.length == 0) {
+	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
 		return true;
 	}
 
@@ -238,8 +244,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_alter_ack(struct dcesrv_call_state *call, struct ncacn_pack
 
 	/* on a pure interface change there is no auth_info structure
 	   setup */
-	if (!call->conn->auth_state.auth_info ||
-	    dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info->credentials.length == 0) {
+	if (call->pkt.auth_length == 0) {
 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
 	}
 
-- 
2.8.1


From 57230961cee9e82ab060b54b5fb8c2b19f672111 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2015 10:31:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 08/40] CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: check pkt->auth_length
 before calling dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(backported from 630dcb55ad7a3a89bcd8643c98a5cdbfb8735ef7)
---
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c      | 13 ++++++++++---
 source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c
index 742d710..cfbccd6 100644
--- a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c
+++ b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c
@@ -701,6 +701,14 @@ static NTSTATUS ncacn_pull_request_auth(struct dcecli_connection *c, TALLOC_CTX
 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL;
 	}
 
+	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
+	}
+
+	if (c->security_state.generic_state == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
 	status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, mem_ctx,
 					  &pkt->u.response.stub_and_verifier,
 					  &auth, &auth_length, false);
@@ -1074,7 +1082,7 @@ static void dcerpc_bind_recv_handler(struct rpc_request *req,
 	}
 
 	/* the bind_ack might contain a reply set of credentials */
-	if (conn->security_state.auth_info && pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info.length) {
+	if (conn->security_state.auth_info && pkt->auth_length) {
 		NTSTATUS status;
 		uint32_t auth_length;
 		status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, conn, &pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info,
@@ -1847,8 +1855,7 @@ static void dcerpc_alter_recv_handler(struct rpc_request *req,
 	}
 
 	/* the alter_resp might contain a reply set of credentials */
-	if (recv_pipe->conn->security_state.auth_info &&
-	    pkt->u.alter_resp.auth_info.length) {
+	if (recv_pipe->conn->security_state.auth_info && pkt->auth_length) {
 		struct dcecli_connection *conn = recv_pipe->conn;
 		NTSTATUS status;
 		uint32_t auth_length;
diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
index 61f2176..3051c1c 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
@@ -320,6 +320,11 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_request(struct dcesrv_call_state *call, DATA_BLOB *full_packet)
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+		DEBUG(1,("dcesrv_auth_request: unexpected auth_length of 0\n"));
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, call,
 					  &pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier,
 					  &auth, &auth_length, false);
-- 
2.8.1


From c35b0e37f7d37459f55d67a5037c08bea4d33acf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2015 01:19:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 09/40] CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: don't allow pkt->auth_length
 == 0 in dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

All callers should have already checked that.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ed83c7657a3b405db1928db06c29f41d2738186)
---
 librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
index 2f599d5..89b7597 100644
--- a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+++ b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 	}
 
 	/* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
+	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
 	if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
 		return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	}
-- 
2.8.1


From 2341eb0cf8395b1fed628ee6779207d916827a5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 07:59:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 10/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: remove auth trailer and
 possible padding within dcerpc_check_auth()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This simplifies the callers a lot.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit df3cdf072d1c1e6fd0a58e0374348758f5c65a49)
---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h         |  5 ++---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c       | 33 ++++++++++-----------------------
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c       | 17 +----------------
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
index d14d8e0..e7cca9e 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
@@ -85,9 +85,8 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_add_auth_footer(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 			   struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 			   DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
-			   size_t header_size,
-			   DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt,
-			   size_t *pad_len);
+			   uint8_t header_size,
+			   DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt);
 
 /* The following definitions come from librpc/rpc/rpc_common.c  */
 
diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
index 76f2acc..d871339 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
@@ -844,19 +844,18 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_add_auth_footer(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 *
 * @param auth		The auth data for the connection
 * @param pkt		The actual ncacn_packet
-* @param pkt_trailer	The stub_and_verifier part of the packet
+* @param pkt_trailer [in][out]	The stub_and_verifier part of the packet,
+* 			the auth_trailer and padding will be removed.
 * @param header_size	The header size
 * @param raw_pkt	The whole raw packet data blob
-* @param pad_len	[out] The padding length used in the packet
 *
 * @return A NTSTATUS error code
 */
 NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 			   struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
 			   DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
-			   size_t header_size,
-			   DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt,
-			   size_t *pad_len)
+			   uint8_t header_size,
+			   DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt)
 {
 	struct schannel_state *schannel_auth;
 	struct auth_ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_ctx;
@@ -868,6 +867,14 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 	DATA_BLOB full_pkt;
 	DATA_BLOB data;
 
+	/*
+	 * These check should be done in the caller.
+	 */
+	SMB_ASSERT(raw_pkt->length == pkt->frag_length);
+	SMB_ASSERT(header_size <= pkt->frag_length);
+	SMB_ASSERT(pkt_trailer->length < pkt->frag_length);
+	SMB_ASSERT((pkt_trailer->length + header_size) <= pkt->frag_length);
+
 	switch (auth->auth_level) {
 	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
 		DEBUG(10, ("Requested Privacy.\n"));
@@ -881,7 +888,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 		if (pkt->auth_length != 0) {
 			break;
 		}
-		*pad_len = 0;
 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
 
 	case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
@@ -890,7 +896,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 				  "authenticated connection!\n"));
 			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
 		}
-		*pad_len = 0;
 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
 
 	default:
@@ -909,10 +914,11 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 		return status;
 	}
 
+	pkt_trailer->length -= auth_length;
 	data = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data + header_size,
-				pkt_trailer->length - auth_length);
-	full_pkt = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data,
-				raw_pkt->length - auth_info.credentials.length);
+			       pkt_trailer->length);
+	full_pkt = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data, raw_pkt->length);
+	full_pkt.length -= auth_info.credentials.length;
 
 	switch (auth->auth_type) {
 	case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE:
@@ -988,10 +994,13 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 	 * pkt_trailer actually has a copy of the raw data, and they
 	 * are still both used in later calls */
 	if (auth->auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+		if (pkt_trailer->length != data.length) {
+			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
 		memcpy(pkt_trailer->data, data.data, data.length);
 	}
 
-	*pad_len = auth_info.auth_pad_length;
+	pkt_trailer->length -= auth_info.auth_pad_length;
 	data_blob_free(&auth_info.credentials);
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 2787fbc..776e2bf 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -404,9 +404,9 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 						DATA_BLOB *rdata,
 						DATA_BLOB *reply_pdu)
 {
-	struct dcerpc_response *r;
+	const struct dcerpc_response *r = NULL;
+	DATA_BLOB tmp_stub = data_blob_null;
 	NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_OK;
-	size_t pad_len = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Point the return values at the real data including the RPC
@@ -440,37 +440,24 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 		r = &pkt->u.response;
 
+		tmp_stub.data = r->stub_and_verifier.data;
+		tmp_stub.length = r->stub_and_verifier.length;
+
 		/* Here's where we deal with incoming sign/seal. */
 		ret = dcerpc_check_auth(cli->auth, pkt,
-					&r->stub_and_verifier,
+					&tmp_stub,
 					DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH,
-					pdu, &pad_len);
+					pdu);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
 			return ret;
 		}
 
-		if (pkt->frag_length < DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH + pad_len) {
-			return NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
-		}
-
 		/* Point the return values at the NDR data. */
-		rdata->data = r->stub_and_verifier.data;
-
-		if (pkt->auth_length) {
-			/* We've already done integer wrap tests in
-			 * dcerpc_check_auth(). */
-			rdata->length = r->stub_and_verifier.length
-					 - pad_len
-					 - DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
-					 - pkt->auth_length;
-		} else {
-			rdata->length = r->stub_and_verifier.length;
-		}
+		*rdata = tmp_stub;
 
-		DEBUG(10, ("Got pdu len %lu, data_len %lu, ss_len %u\n",
+		DEBUG(10, ("Got pdu len %lu, data_len %lu\n",
 			   (long unsigned int)pdu->length,
-			   (long unsigned int)rdata->length,
-			   (unsigned int)pad_len));
+			   (long unsigned int)rdata->length));
 
 		/*
 		 * If this is the first reply, and the allocation hint is
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 964b843..0ab7dc6 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1848,7 +1848,6 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_request(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 {
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	size_t hdr_size = DCERPC_REQUEST_LENGTH;
-	size_t pad_len;
 
 	DEBUG(10, ("Checking request auth.\n"));
 
@@ -1859,25 +1858,11 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_request(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 	/* in case of sealing this function will unseal the data in place */
 	status = dcerpc_check_auth(auth, pkt,
 				   &pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier,
-				   hdr_size, raw_pkt,
-				   &pad_len);
+				   hdr_size, raw_pkt);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 		return status;
 	}
 
-
-	/* remove padding and auth trailer,
-	 * this way the caller will get just the data */
-	if (pkt->auth_length) {
-		size_t trail_len = pad_len
-					+ DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
-					+ pkt->auth_length;
-		if (pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length < trail_len) {
-			return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
-		}
-		pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length -= trail_len;
-	}
-
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
 
-- 
2.8.1


From 9ecba8f4635aa5dbd42e4838ce124a92395b64ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 07:59:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: let dcerpc_check_auth()
 auth_{type,level} against the expected values.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 19f489d32c03ff5fafd34fe86a075d782af1989a)
---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
index d871339..c07835f 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
@@ -914,6 +914,14 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 		return status;
 	}
 
+	if (auth_info.auth_type != auth->auth_type) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	if (auth_info.auth_level != auth->auth_level) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
 	pkt_trailer->length -= auth_length;
 	data = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data + header_size,
 			       pkt_trailer->length);
-- 
2.8.1


From 765c10dacf39a3c06c6b12651c205ac270e7fcea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 12/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of
 dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The does much more validation than dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth().

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit acea87f158f02c3240abff45c3e54c7d5fa60b29)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 20 ++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 776e2bf..27e37f8 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -1938,20 +1938,15 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 		rpc_pipe_bind_step_two_trigger(req);
 		return;
 
-	case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
-	case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO:
-	case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_KRB5:
-		/* Paranoid lenght checks */
-		if (pkt->frag_length < DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
-						+ pkt->auth_length) {
-			tevent_req_nterror(req,
-					NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+	default:
+		if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
 			return;
 		}
 		/* get auth credentials */
-		status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(talloc_tos(),
-						 &pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info,
-						 &auth, false);
+		status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, talloc_tos(),
+						  &pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info,
+						  &auth, NULL, true);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 			DEBUG(0, ("Failed to pull dcerpc auth: %s.\n",
 				  nt_errstr(status)));
@@ -1959,9 +1954,6 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 			return;
 		}
 		break;
-
-	default:
-		goto err_out;
 	}
 
 	/*
-- 
2.8.1


From b58616bbcc810b076e5fd9dd976272847f832b06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 13/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of
 dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() in cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 81bbffa14f5f6faa9801a3bf2d564d2762d49bb6)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 27e37f8..6a22d38 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -429,17 +429,89 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 	/* Ensure we have the correct type. */
 	switch (pkt->ptype) {
-	case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP:
+	case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK:
+		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Bind NACK received from %s!\n",
+			  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli)));
+
+		ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+						DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK,
+						0, /* max_auth_info */
+						DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+						DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
+						0); /* optional flags */
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+				  "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
+				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		/* Use this for now... */
+		return NT_STATUS_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
 	case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK:
+		ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+					expected_pkt_type,
+					pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info.length,
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+				  "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
+				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+			return ret;
+		}
 
-		/* Client code never receives this kind of packets */
 		break;
 
+	case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP:
+		ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+					expected_pkt_type,
+					pkt->u.alter_resp.auth_info.length,
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
+					DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+				  "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
+				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		break;
 
 	case DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE:
 
 		r = &pkt->u.response;
 
+		ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+						expected_pkt_type,
+						r->stub_and_verifier.length,
+						0, /* required_flags */
+						DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+						DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+				  "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
+				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
 		tmp_stub.data = r->stub_and_verifier.data;
 		tmp_stub.length = r->stub_and_verifier.length;
 
@@ -449,6 +521,12 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 					DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH,
 					pdu);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+				  "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
+				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
 			return ret;
 		}
 
@@ -478,14 +556,24 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 		break;
 
-	case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK:
-		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Bind NACK received from %s!\n",
-			  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli)));
-		/* Use this for now... */
-		return NT_STATUS_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED;
-
 	case DCERPC_PKT_FAULT:
 
+		ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+						DCERPC_PKT_FAULT,
+						0, /* max_auth_info */
+						DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+						DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
+						DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+				  "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
+				  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+				  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
+				  nt_errstr(ret)));
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
 		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": RPC fault code %s received "
 			  "from %s!\n",
 			  dcerpc_errstr(talloc_tos(),
@@ -502,13 +590,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 	}
 
-	if (pkt->ptype != expected_pkt_type) {
-		DEBUG(3, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
-			  "RPC packet type - %u, not %u\n",
-			  rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
-			  pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type));
-		return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
-	}
 
 	if (pkt->call_id != call_id) {
 		DEBUG(3, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
-- 
2.8.1


From 3e03b1e6d5b20c14d53763f22442bf510a8d6dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 14:48:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 14/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: protect
 rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu() against too large payloads
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 98182969e761429e577064e1a0fd5cbc6b50d7d9)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 6a22d38..755b458 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -1007,6 +1007,11 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length > MAX_RPC_DATA_SIZE) {
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/* Now copy the data portion out of the pdu into rbuf. */
 	if (state->reply_pdu.length < state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length) {
 		if (!data_blob_realloc(NULL, &state->reply_pdu,
-- 
2.8.1


From fa884c266be5d808d19955f92921417f435b2957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 22:51:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 15/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: verify auth_{type,level}
 in rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit df51c22bea7fbf906613ceb160f16f298b2e3106)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 755b458..1c4ff01 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -2039,6 +2039,21 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 			tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
 			return;
 		}
+
+		if (auth.auth_type != pauth->auth_type) {
+			DEBUG(0, (__location__ " Auth type %u mismatch expected %u.\n",
+				  auth.auth_type, pauth->auth_type));
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		if (auth.auth_level != pauth->auth_level) {
+			DEBUG(0, (__location__ " Auth level %u mismatch expected %u.\n",
+				  auth.auth_level, pauth->auth_level));
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+			return;
+		}
+
 		break;
 	}
 
-- 
2.8.1


From 6d2767ad8b084590c572e90d1985ca6d7d36b188 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 16/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of
 dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() in api_pipe_{bind_req,alter_context,bind_auth3}()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2a92546590a78760d2fe0e63067a3888dbce53be)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 62 +++++++++----------------------------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 0ab7dc6..40b1b8e 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1012,25 +1012,12 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	 * Check if this is an authenticated bind request.
 	 */
 	if (pkt->auth_length) {
-		/* Quick length check. Won't catch a bad auth footer,
-		 * prevents overrun. */
-
-		if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN +
-					DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH +
-					pkt->auth_length) {
-			DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: auth_len (%u) "
-				"too long for fragment %u.\n",
-				(unsigned int)pkt->auth_length,
-				(unsigned int)pkt->frag_length));
-			goto err_exit;
-		}
-
 		/*
 		 * Decode the authentication verifier.
 		 */
-		status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
-						 &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
-						 &auth_info, p->endian);
+		status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
+						  &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
+						  &auth_info, NULL, true);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 			DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
 			goto err_exit;
@@ -1233,23 +1220,13 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	/* Ensure there's enough data for an authenticated request. */
-	if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN
-				+ DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
-				+ pkt->auth_length) {
-			DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_process: auth_len "
-				"%u is too large.\n",
-                        (unsigned int)pkt->auth_length));
-		goto err;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Decode the authentication verifier response.
 	 */
 
-	status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
-					 &pkt->u.auth3.auth_info,
-					 &auth_info, p->endian);
+	status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
+					  &pkt->u.auth3.auth_info,
+					  &auth_info, NULL, true);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("Failed to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
 		goto err;
@@ -1382,34 +1359,21 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	 * Check if this is an authenticated alter context request.
 	 */
 	if (pkt->auth_length) {
-		/* Quick length check. Won't catch a bad auth footer,
-		 * prevents overrun. */
-
-		if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN +
-					DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH +
-					pkt->auth_length) {
-			DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: auth_len (%u) "
-				"too long for fragment %u.\n",
-				(unsigned int)pkt->auth_length,
-				(unsigned int)pkt->frag_length ));
+		/* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
+		if (p->pipe_bound) {
+			DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
+				  "Altering Context not yet supported!\n"));
 			goto err_exit;
 		}
 
-		status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
-						 &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
-						 &auth_info, p->endian);
+		status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
+						  &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
+						  &auth_info, NULL, true);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 			DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
 			goto err_exit;
 		}
 
-		/* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
-		if (p->pipe_bound) {
-			DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
-				  "Altering Context not yet supported!\n"));
-			goto err_exit;
-		}
-
 		if (auth_info.auth_type != p->auth.auth_type) {
 			DEBUG(0, ("Auth type mismatch! Client sent %d, "
 				  "but auth was started as type %d!\n",
-- 
2.8.1


From 7400ac11282d540d4f5f80d0f58ec99beabb7d8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:38:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing
 sec_verification_trailer mark the connection as broken

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 189c0fbb7a3405f0893f23e5b8d755d259f98eaf)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 40b1b8e..da9b91c 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1663,6 +1663,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipes_struct *p,
 
 	if (!srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer(p, pkt, pipe_fns)) {
 		DEBUG(1, ("srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer: failed\n"));
+		set_incoming_fault(p);
 		setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED));
 		data_blob_free(&p->out_data.rdata);
 		TALLOC_FREE(frame);
-- 
2.8.1


From 55da4653f5986989e46be6320f96590f8ebb4ef7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 18/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't ignore failures of
 dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 25bf597124f217c55b5ca71a5ea9cb0ea83943e5)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index da9b91c..71b4665 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1152,6 +1152,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
 			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		goto err_exit;
 	}
 
 	if (auth_resp.length) {
@@ -1469,6 +1470,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
 			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		goto err_exit;
 	}
 
 	if (auth_resp.length) {
-- 
2.8.1


From 893c840a1aac6711a081eb8e25f2c2a6078fc373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 19/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't allow auth3 if the
 authentication was already finished
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69280e6acef7c3941407d4308b659c5e90ed702d)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 71b4665..4e5b50d4 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1216,8 +1216,15 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 
 	DEBUG(5, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__));
 
+	/* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
+	if (p->pipe_bound) {
+		DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
+			  "AUTH3 not supported!\n"));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
-		DEBUG(0, ("No auth field sent for bind request!\n"));
+		DEBUG(1, ("No auth field sent for auth3 request!\n"));
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-- 
2.8.1


From a66baed0c65b7acb4d76ef9ea3ae1248a6b5773a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:18:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 20/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing auth3 mark
 the authentication as invalid
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c96ef7b4fbd925607b26d351b14ad9a95febd88)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 4e5b50d4..d28ba8e 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 	return true;
 
 err:
-
+	p->pipe_bound = false;
 	TALLOC_FREE(p->auth.auth_ctx);
 	return false;
 }
-- 
2.8.1


From e47becdf2c03d68662ab998c4608adb371ca2f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 21/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make sure auth_level
 isn't changed by alter_context or auth3
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 63d21d2546a1064be73582a499ec15b0e11e2708)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index d28ba8e..1b81a4c 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1252,6 +1252,13 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	if (auth_info.auth_level != p->auth.auth_level) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Auth level mismatch! Client sent %d, "
+			  "but auth was started as level %d!\n",
+			  auth_info.auth_level, p->auth.auth_level));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
 	case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
 		ntlmssp_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
@@ -1389,6 +1396,12 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 			goto err_exit;
 		}
 
+		if (auth_info.auth_level != p->auth.auth_level) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("Auth level mismatch! Client sent %d, "
+				  "but auth was started as level %d!\n",
+				  auth_info.auth_level, p->auth.auth_level));
+			goto err_exit;
+		}
 
 		switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
 		case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO:
-- 
2.8.1


From 687a4801391c946a62d07a7bdad096a97da0d432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 09:15:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 22/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: ensure that the message
 ordering doesn't violate the spec
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The first pdu is always a BIND.

REQUEST pdus are only allowed once the authentication
is finished.

A simple anonymous authentication is finished after the BIND.
Real authentication may need additional ALTER or AUTH3 exchanges.

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0239bfa562ee303c4ac204375b3c66ca287f6cb0)
---
 source3/include/ntdomain.h        |  7 ++++++
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c |  1 +
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c   |  1 +
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c     | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/include/ntdomain.h b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
index 650f1d0..b3c5451 100644
--- a/source3/include/ntdomain.h
+++ b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
@@ -139,6 +139,13 @@ struct pipes_struct {
 	bool pipe_bound;
 
 	/*
+	 * States we can be in.
+	 */
+	bool allow_alter;
+	bool allow_bind;
+	bool allow_auth3;
+
+	/*
 	 * Set the DCERPC_FAULT to return.
 	 */
 
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
index efdee27..f2e9d10 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ struct pipes_struct *make_internal_rpc_pipe_p(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 	p->syntax = *syntax;
 	p->transport = NCALRPC;
+	p->allow_bind = true;
 
 	DEBUG(4,("Created internal pipe %s (pipes_open=%d)\n",
 		 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), syntax), pipes_open));
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
index 8ec55bb..376d26a 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static int make_server_pipes_struct(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 	p->syntax = id;
 	p->transport = transport;
 	p->ncalrpc_as_system = ncalrpc_as_system;
+	p->allow_bind = true;
 
 	p->mem_ctx = talloc_named(p, 0, "pipe %s %p", pipe_name, p);
 	if (!p->mem_ctx) {
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 1b81a4c..41111aa 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -279,6 +279,9 @@ static bool setup_bind_nak(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 	p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
 	p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
 	p->pipe_bound = False;
+	p->allow_bind = false;
+	p->allow_alter = false;
+	p->allow_auth3 = false;
 
 	return True;
 }
@@ -828,6 +831,11 @@ static NTSTATUS pipe_auth_verify_final(struct pipes_struct *p)
 	void *mech_ctx;
 	NTSTATUS status;
 
+	if (p->auth.auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
+		p->pipe_bound = true;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
 	switch (p->auth.auth_type) {
 	case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
 		ntlmssp_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
@@ -919,13 +927,11 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	DATA_BLOB auth_resp = data_blob_null;
 	DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
 
-	/* No rebinds on a bound pipe - use alter context. */
-	if (p->pipe_bound) {
-		DEBUG(2,("api_pipe_bind_req: rejecting bind request on bound "
-			 "pipe %s.\n",
-			 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
+	if (!p->allow_bind) {
+		DEBUG(2,("Pipe not in allow bind state\n"));
 		return setup_bind_nak(p, pkt);
 	}
+	p->allow_bind = false;
 
 	if (pkt->u.bind.num_contexts == 0) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
@@ -1192,6 +1198,22 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
 
 	TALLOC_FREE(auth_blob.data);
+
+	if (bind_ack_ctx.result == 0) {
+		p->allow_alter = true;
+		p->allow_auth3 = true;
+		if (p->auth.auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
+			status = pipe_auth_verify_final(p);
+			if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+				DEBUG(0, ("pipe_auth_verify_final failed: %s\n",
+					  nt_errstr(status)));
+				goto err_exit;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		goto err_exit;
+	}
+
 	return True;
 
   err_exit:
@@ -1216,6 +1238,11 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 
 	DEBUG(5, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__));
 
+	if (!p->allow_auth3) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not in allow auth3 state.\n"));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	/* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
 	if (p->pipe_bound) {
 		DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
@@ -1312,6 +1339,10 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 
 err:
 	p->pipe_bound = false;
+	p->allow_bind = false;
+	p->allow_alter = false;
+	p->allow_auth3 = false;
+
 	TALLOC_FREE(p->auth.auth_ctx);
 	return false;
 }
@@ -1338,6 +1369,11 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 
 	DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_alter_context: make response. %d\n", __LINE__));
 
+	if (!p->allow_alter) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not in allow alter state.\n"));
+		goto err_exit;
+	}
+
 	if (pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id != 0) {
 		assoc_gid = pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id;
 	} else {
@@ -1363,7 +1399,6 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		bind_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
 		bind_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
 	} else {
-		p->pipe_bound = False;
 		/* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */
 		bind_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
 		bind_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
@@ -1826,6 +1861,10 @@ void set_incoming_fault(struct pipes_struct *p)
 	p->in_data.pdu.length = 0;
 	p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_CANT_PERFORM;
 
+	p->allow_alter = false;
+	p->allow_auth3 = false;
+	p->pipe_bound = false;
+
 	DEBUG(10, ("Setting fault state\n"));
 }
 
-- 
2.8.1


From 45701966d49ec1003f19c137a548c26915f75a99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 16:06:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 23/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: use 'alter' instead of
 'bind' for variables in api_pipe_alter_context()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit cdefee174d2f8920323e9e62966df4f4ced49ed3)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 41111aa..382d94a 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	uint16 assoc_gid;
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	union dcerpc_payload u;
-	struct dcerpc_ack_ctx bind_ack_ctx;
+	struct dcerpc_ack_ctx alter_ack_ctx;
 	DATA_BLOB auth_resp = data_blob_null;
 	DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
 	int pad_len = 0;
@@ -1374,8 +1374,8 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		goto err_exit;
 	}
 
-	if (pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id != 0) {
-		assoc_gid = pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id;
+	if (pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id != 0) {
+		assoc_gid = pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id;
 	} else {
 		assoc_gid = 0x53f0;
 	}
@@ -1385,24 +1385,24 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	 */
 
 	/* If the requested abstract synt uuid doesn't match our client pipe,
-		reject the bind_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's,
+		reject the alter_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's,
 		ver 0 (observed when NT5 attempts to bind to abstract interfaces
 		unknown to NT4)
 		Needed when adding entries to a DACL from NT5 - SK */
 
 	if (check_bind_req(p,
-			&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax,
-			&pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0],
-			pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].context_id)) {
+			&pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax,
+			&pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0],
+			pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].context_id)) {
 
-		bind_ack_ctx.result = 0;
-		bind_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
-		bind_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
+		alter_ack_ctx.result = 0;
+		alter_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
+		alter_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
 	} else {
 		/* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */
-		bind_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
-		bind_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
-		bind_ack_ctx.syntax = null_ndr_syntax_id;
+		alter_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
+		alter_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
+		alter_ack_ctx.syntax = null_ndr_syntax_id;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		}
 
 		status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
-						  &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
+						  &pkt->u.alter.auth_info,
 						  &auth_info, NULL, true);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 			DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	u.alter_resp.secondary_address_size = 1;
 
 	u.alter_resp.num_results = 1;
-	u.alter_resp.ctx_list = &bind_ack_ctx;
+	u.alter_resp.ctx_list = &alter_ack_ctx;
 
 	/* NOTE: We leave the auth_info empty so we can calculate the padding
 	 * later and then append the auth_info --simo */
@@ -1523,7 +1523,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 					  &u,
 					  &p->out_data.frag);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-		DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
+		DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall alter_resp packet. (%s)\n",
 			  nt_errstr(status)));
 		goto err_exit;
 	}
-- 
2.8.1


From 62b936e134a53662601b0f614f95dbca5ff7a369 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 16:06:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 24/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: verify presentation
 context arrays
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e6b4abac14840e4cee1afc5d4811b0f0277eade)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 382d94a..335af2a 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -934,7 +934,12 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	p->allow_bind = false;
 
 	if (pkt->u.bind.num_contexts == 0) {
-		DEBUG(0, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
+		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
+		goto err_exit;
+	}
+
+	if (pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].num_transfer_syntaxes == 0) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no transfer syntaxes around\n"));
 		goto err_exit;
 	}
 
@@ -1374,6 +1379,16 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		goto err_exit;
 	}
 
+	if (pkt->u.alter.num_contexts == 0) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: no rpc contexts around\n"));
+		goto err_exit;
+	}
+
+	if (pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].num_transfer_syntaxes == 0) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: no transfer syntaxes around\n"));
+		goto err_exit;
+	}
+
 	if (pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id != 0) {
 		assoc_gid = pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id;
 	} else {
-- 
2.8.1


From 585e8aefafcb5f8c501cdf4454b375ebda82f7a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 16:06:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 25/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of
 dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() to verify incoming pdus
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit e39fdceb25fc75b6f8c77c097bf8dbd2f4286618)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 335af2a..2f404b4 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "ntdomain.h"
 #include "rpc_server/srv_pipe.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
 #include "../librpc/ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
 #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
 #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
@@ -933,6 +934,25 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	}
 	p->allow_bind = false;
 
+	status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+			DCERPC_PKT_BIND,
+			pkt->u.bind.auth_info.length,
+			0, /* required flags */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN |
+			0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+		goto err_exit;
+	}
+
 	if (pkt->u.bind.num_contexts == 0) {
 		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
 		goto err_exit;
@@ -1248,6 +1268,25 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+			DCERPC_PKT_AUTH3,
+			pkt->u.auth3.auth_info.length,
+			0, /* required flags */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN |
+			0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	/* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
 	if (p->pipe_bound) {
 		DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
@@ -1379,6 +1418,25 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		goto err_exit;
 	}
 
+	status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+			DCERPC_PKT_ALTER,
+			pkt->u.alter.auth_info.length,
+			0, /* required flags */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN |
+			0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+		goto err_exit;
+	}
+
 	if (pkt->u.alter.num_contexts == 0) {
 		DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: no rpc contexts around\n"));
 		goto err_exit;
@@ -1923,6 +1981,29 @@ static bool process_request_pdu(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt
 		return False;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * We don't ignore DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_PENDING_CANCEL.
+	 * TODO: we can reject it with DCERPC_FAULT_NO_CALL_ACTIVE later.
+	 */
+	status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
+			DCERPC_PKT_REQUEST,
+			pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length,
+			0, /* required_flags */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
+			0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
+			DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("process_request_pdu: invalid pdu: %s\n",
+			  nt_errstr(status)));
+		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+		set_incoming_fault(p);
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	/* Store the opnum */
 	p->opnum = pkt->u.request.opnum;
 
-- 
2.8.1


From b16b1a5f331adc3bb2f3d0bee586ec084935a202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:40:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 26/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: disconnect the connection
 after a fatal FAULT pdu
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 664d7ace0e68b42d2de99583757e0a985647eb4b)
---
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
index 376d26a..3ba83e0 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
@@ -664,6 +664,12 @@ static void named_pipe_packet_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
+	if (npc->p->fault_state != 0) {
+		DEBUG(2, ("Disconnect after fault\n"));
+		sys_errno = EINVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	/* clear out any data that may have been left around */
 	npc->count = 0;
 	TALLOC_FREE(npc->iov);
@@ -1392,6 +1398,12 @@ static void dcerpc_ncacn_packet_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
+	if (ncacn_conn->p->fault_state != 0) {
+		DEBUG(2, ("Disconnect after fault\n"));
+		sys_errno = EINVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	/* clear out any data that may have been left around */
 	ncacn_conn->count = 0;
 	TALLOC_FREE(ncacn_conn->iov);
-- 
2.8.1


From 642d2b7090e46a87bc94cabf29eccb09e329c125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:38:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 27/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing BIND mark
 the connection as broken
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8d97085efd8782e48d0f1162e3f56756acb99472)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 2f404b4..6275190 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ static bool setup_bind_nak(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 	p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0;
 	p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
 
+	set_incoming_fault(p);
 	TALLOC_FREE(p->auth.auth_ctx);
 	p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
 	p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
-- 
2.8.1


From f4aa07176636982d9be3c0ce2452fc43a8781d47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:38:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 28/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: use
 DCERPC_NCA_S_PROTO_ERROR FAULTs for protocol errors
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d30363f08efb81b22055d4445977c96df3737adf)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 6275190..3fb8855 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@ void set_incoming_fault(struct pipes_struct *p)
 	data_blob_free(&p->in_data.data);
 	p->in_data.pdu_needed_len = 0;
 	p->in_data.pdu.length = 0;
-	p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_CANT_PERFORM;
+	p->fault_state = DCERPC_NCA_S_PROTO_ERROR;
 
 	p->allow_alter = false;
 	p->allow_auth3 = false;
@@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ done:
 			 "pipe %s\n", get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
 								&p->syntax)));
 		set_incoming_fault(p);
-		setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR));
+		setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_NCA_S_PROTO_ERROR));
 		TALLOC_FREE(pkt);
 	} else {
 		/*
-- 
2.8.1


From ef175975f587d73092461c36b10e4c9cf1805727 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 10:58:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 29/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: remove unused
 dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 02aef978ff8f16009a52c2d981d414d019bc8dd9)
---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h         |  4 ----
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 41 -------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
index e7cca9e..9452e85 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
@@ -71,10 +71,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 				 uint32_t auth_context_id,
 				 const DATA_BLOB *credentials,
 				 DATA_BLOB *blob);
-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-				 const DATA_BLOB *blob,
-				 struct dcerpc_auth *r,
-				 bool bigendian);
 NTSTATUS dcerpc_guess_sizes(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 			    size_t header_len, size_t data_left,
 			    size_t max_xmit_frag, size_t pad_alignment,
diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
index c07835f..e4d0e3a 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
@@ -210,47 +210,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 }
 
 /**
-* @brief Decodes a dcerpc_auth blob
-*
-* @param mem_ctx	The memory context on which to allocate the packet
-*			elements
-* @param blob		The blob of data to decode
-* @param r		An empty dcerpc_auth structure, must not be NULL
-*
-* @return a NTSTATUS error code
-*/
-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-				 const DATA_BLOB *blob,
-				 struct dcerpc_auth *r,
-				 bool bigendian)
-{
-	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
-	struct ndr_pull *ndr;
-
-	ndr = ndr_pull_init_blob(blob, mem_ctx);
-	if (!ndr) {
-		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
-	}
-	if (bigendian) {
-		ndr->flags |= LIBNDR_FLAG_BIGENDIAN;
-	}
-
-	ndr_err = ndr_pull_dcerpc_auth(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS, r);
-
-	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
-		talloc_free(ndr);
-		return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
-	}
-	talloc_free(ndr);
-
-	if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
-		NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(dcerpc_auth, r);
-	}
-
-	return NT_STATUS_OK;
-}
-
-/**
 * @brief Calculate how much data we can in a packet, including calculating
 *	 auth token and pad lengths.
 *
-- 
2.8.1


From 49d0e60d28d3b615d4ee368cd3f260b3a6386858 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 30/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: check the transfer syntax
 in check_bind_req() first
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9464684010461947fa98d8ee084069e9cf362625)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 3fb8855..0e6b073 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -351,16 +351,24 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
 		 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
 
+	ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(transfer, &ndr_transfer_syntax);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DEBUG(1,("check_bind_req unknown transfer syntax for "
+			 "%s context_id=%u\n",
+			 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract),
+			 (unsigned)context_id));
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	/* we have to check all now since win2k introduced a new UUID on the lsaprpc pipe */
-	if (rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(abstract) &&
-	   ndr_syntax_id_equal(transfer, &ndr_transfer_syntax)) {
-		DEBUG(3, ("check_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n",
-			rpc_srv_get_pipe_cli_name(abstract),
-			rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(abstract)));
-	} else {
+	if (!rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(abstract)) {
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	DEBUG(3, ("check_bind_req: %s -> %s rpc service\n",
+		  rpc_srv_get_pipe_cli_name(abstract),
+		  rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(abstract)));
+
 	context_fns = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct pipe_rpc_fns);
 	if (context_fns == NULL) {
 		DEBUG(0,("check_bind_req: malloc() failed!\n"));
-- 
2.8.1


From 7ee6698f706e51568f53347f422ac6671cdba9a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 31/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't allow an existing
 context to be changed in check_bind_req()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

An alter context can't change the syntax of an existing context,
a new context_id will be used for that.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit a995740d4e7fbd8fbb5c8c6280b73eaceae53574)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 0e6b073..4263a91 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -360,6 +360,28 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	for (context_fns = p->contexts;
+	     context_fns != NULL;
+	     context_fns = context_fns->next)
+	{
+		if (context_fns->context_id != context_id) {
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(&context_fns->syntax,
+					 abstract);
+		if (ok) {
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		DEBUG(1,("check_bind_req: changing abstract syntax for "
+			 "%s context_id=%u into %s not supported\n",
+			 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &context_fns->syntax),
+			 (unsigned)context_id,
+			 get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	/* we have to check all now since win2k introduced a new UUID on the lsaprpc pipe */
 	if (!rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(abstract)) {
 		return false;
-- 
2.8.1


From 79a238d0c868c7e182f49637b66f544dc1dd86da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 32/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: pass struct
 pipe_auth_data to create_rpc_{bind_auth3,alter_context}()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f556d9245c13d018d4e772f06d013ebe558703d9)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 26 ++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 1c4ff01..3af3d8f 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -1816,9 +1816,8 @@ static bool check_bind_response(const struct dcerpc_bind_ack *r,
 
 static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 				struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
-				uint32 rpc_call_id,
-				enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type,
-				enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level,
+				struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+				uint32_t rpc_call_id,
 				DATA_BLOB *pauth_blob,
 				DATA_BLOB *rpc_out)
 {
@@ -1828,8 +1827,8 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 	u.auth3._pad = 0;
 
 	status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(mem_ctx,
-					 auth_type,
-					 auth_level,
+					 auth->auth_type,
+					 auth->auth_level,
 					 0, /* auth_pad_length */
 					 1, /* auth_context_id */
 					 pauth_blob,
@@ -1861,9 +1860,8 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
  ********************************************************************/
 
 static NTSTATUS create_rpc_alter_context(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-					enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type,
-					enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level,
-					uint32 rpc_call_id,
+					struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+					uint32_t rpc_call_id,
 					const struct ndr_syntax_id *abstract,
 					const struct ndr_syntax_id *transfer,
 					const DATA_BLOB *pauth_blob, /* spnego auth blob already created. */
@@ -1873,8 +1871,8 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_alter_context(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 	NTSTATUS status;
 
 	status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(mem_ctx,
-					 auth_type,
-					 auth_level,
+					 auth->auth_type,
+					 auth->auth_level,
 					 0, /* auth_pad_length */
 					 1, /* auth_context_id */
 					 pauth_blob,
@@ -2300,9 +2298,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_bind_next_send(struct tevent_req *req,
 	/* Now prepare the alter context pdu. */
 	data_blob_free(&state->rpc_out);
 
-	status = create_rpc_alter_context(state,
-					  auth->auth_type,
-					  auth->auth_level,
+	status = create_rpc_alter_context(state, auth,
 					  state->rpc_call_id,
 					  &state->cli->abstract_syntax,
 					  &state->cli->transfer_syntax,
@@ -2335,10 +2331,8 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_bind_finish_send(struct tevent_req *req,
 	/* Now prepare the auth3 context pdu. */
 	data_blob_free(&state->rpc_out);
 
-	status = create_rpc_bind_auth3(state, state->cli,
+	status = create_rpc_bind_auth3(state, state->cli, auth,
 					state->rpc_call_id,
-					auth->auth_type,
-					auth->auth_level,
 					auth_token,
 					&state->rpc_out);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-- 
2.8.1


From 18a50ed6ead11287ff72cb38f100d0f2641c3e7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 33/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: add auth_context_id to
 struct pipe_auth_data
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit cbf20b43d7b40e3b6ccf044f6f51a5adff1f5e6d)
---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
index 9452e85..c25b0f5 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct pipe_auth_data {
 	bool verified_bitmask1;
 
 	void *auth_ctx;
+	uint32_t auth_context_id;
 
 	/* Only the client code uses these 3 for now */
 	char *domain;
-- 
2.8.1


From 7dbaaca2a638406331d4653e1afdc18f7c8502f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 34/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of
 pipe_auth_data->auth_context_id
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This is better than using hardcoded values.
We need to use auth_context_id = 1 for authenticated
connections, as old Samba server (before this patchset)
will use a hardcoded value of 1.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit ae68d3f325c3880144b80385779c9445897646e6)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 3af3d8f..755d676 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_req(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 						auth->auth_type,
 						auth->auth_level,
 						0, /* auth_pad_length */
-						1, /* auth_context_id */
+						auth->auth_context_id,
 						&auth_token,
 						&auth_info);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
@@ -1830,7 +1830,7 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 					 auth->auth_type,
 					 auth->auth_level,
 					 0, /* auth_pad_length */
-					 1, /* auth_context_id */
+					 auth->auth_context_id,
 					 pauth_blob,
 					 &u.auth3.auth_info);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
@@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_alter_context(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 					 auth->auth_type,
 					 auth->auth_level,
 					 0, /* auth_pad_length */
-					 1, /* auth_context_id */
+					 auth->auth_context_id,
 					 pauth_blob,
 					 &auth_info);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
@@ -2704,6 +2704,7 @@ NTSTATUS rpccli_ncalrpc_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 	result->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NCALRPC_AS_SYSTEM;
 	result->auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT;
+	result->auth_context_id = 1;
 
 	result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, "");
 	result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, "");
@@ -2728,6 +2729,7 @@ NTSTATUS rpccli_anon_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 	result->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
 	result->auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
+	result->auth_context_id = 0;
 
 	result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, "");
 	result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, "");
@@ -2765,6 +2767,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpccli_ntlmssp_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 	result->auth_type = auth_type;
 	result->auth_level = auth_level;
+	result->auth_context_id = 1;
 
 	result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, username);
 	result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, domain);
@@ -2836,6 +2839,7 @@ NTSTATUS rpccli_schannel_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *domain,
 
 	result->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL;
 	result->auth_level = auth_level;
+	result->auth_context_id = 1;
 
 	result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, "");
 	result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, domain);
@@ -3500,6 +3504,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_krb5(struct cli_state *cli,
 	}
 	auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_KRB5;
 	auth->auth_level = auth_level;
+	auth->auth_context_id = 1;
 
 	if (!username) {
 		username = "";
@@ -3570,6 +3575,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_spnego_krb5(struct cli_state *cli,
 	}
 	auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO;
 	auth->auth_level = auth_level;
+	auth->auth_context_id = 1;
 
 	if (!username) {
 		username = "";
@@ -3644,6 +3650,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_spnego_ntlmssp(struct cli_state *cli,
 	}
 	auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO;
 	auth->auth_level = auth_level;
+	auth->auth_context_id = 1;
 
 	if (!username) {
 		username = "";
-- 
2.8.1


From 82cd4e90c70d1ababd5fa1ee61206e37edbf40e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 35/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of
 pipe_auth_data->auth_context_id
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This is better than using hardcoded values.
We need to use the value the client used in the BIND request.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2bc617293a5d8652e484af69660b3646f3d48690)
---
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c |  1 +
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c     | 11 +++++++----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
index f2e9d10..c0f24a6 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
@@ -781,6 +781,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_pipe_open_external(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 	}
 	result->auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
 	result->auth->auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
+	result->auth->auth_context_id = 0;
 
 	status = rpccli_anon_bind_data(result, &auth);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index 4263a91..d6c4118 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind(struct pipes_struct *p,
 
 	p->auth.auth_ctx = spnego_ctx;
 	p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO;
+	p->auth.auth_context_id = auth_info->auth_context_id;
 
 	DEBUG(10, ("SPNEGO auth started\n"));
 
@@ -644,6 +645,7 @@ static bool pipe_schannel_auth_bind(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	/* We're finished with this bind - no more packets. */
 	p->auth.auth_ctx = schannel_auth;
 	p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL;
+	p->auth.auth_context_id = auth_info->auth_context_id;
 
 	p->pipe_bound = True;
 
@@ -688,6 +690,7 @@ static bool pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind(struct pipes_struct *p,
 
 	p->auth.auth_ctx = ntlmssp_state;
 	p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP;
+	p->auth.auth_context_id = auth_info->auth_context_id;
 
 	DEBUG(10, (__location__ ": NTLMSSP auth started\n"));
 
@@ -1173,6 +1176,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		p->pipe_bound = True;
 		/* The session key was initialized from the SMB
 		 * session in make_internal_rpc_pipe_p */
+		p->auth.auth_context_id = 0;
 	}
 
 	ZERO_STRUCT(u.bind_ack);
@@ -1218,12 +1222,11 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	}
 
 	if (auth_resp.length) {
-
 		status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
 						 auth_type,
 						 auth_info.auth_level,
-						 0,
-						 1, /* auth_context_id */
+						 0, /* pad_len */
+						 p->auth.auth_context_id,
 						 &auth_resp,
 						 &auth_blob);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
@@ -1646,7 +1649,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 						 auth_info.auth_type,
 						 auth_info.auth_level,
 						 pad_len,
-						 1, /* auth_context_id */
+						 p->auth.auth_context_id,
 						 &auth_resp,
 						 &auth_blob);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-- 
2.8.1


From 8d1fb1fcf58b08cbf27579382ea648aefb9e7dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 36/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: make use of
 auth->auth_context_id in dcerpc_add_auth_footer()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 61faaa63e7e610308c72ae4c41a5c7b5b7312685)
---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
index e4d0e3a..977a372 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_add_auth_footer(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 					 auth->auth_type,
 					 auth->auth_level,
 					 pad_len,
-					 1 /* context id. */,
+					 auth->auth_context_id,
 					 &auth_blob,
 					 &auth_info);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-- 
2.8.1


From 2a44cfc65f7dc1ccfd2d6a5abe5d26e94a085aa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 37/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: verify auth_context_id in
 dcerpc_check_auth()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0cf3151c843e2c779b534743b455e630d89e2ba9)
---
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
index 977a372..b00cf1bf 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
@@ -881,6 +881,10 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
 	}
 
+	if (auth_info.auth_context_id != auth->auth_context_id) {
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
 	pkt_trailer->length -= auth_length;
 	data = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data + header_size,
 			       pkt_trailer->length);
-- 
2.8.1


From 68dcc277d5af506706d3fdac43891e43ccb4ceea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 22:51:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 38/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: verify auth_context_id in
 rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 93a0f92b8ebecb38f92d3b2c9a946b486ee91d3c)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index 755d676..ee33e80 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -2052,6 +2052,14 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 			return;
 		}
 
+		if (auth.auth_context_id != pauth->auth_context_id) {
+			DEBUG(0, (__location__ " Auth context id %u mismatch expected %u.\n",
+				  (unsigned)auth.auth_context_id,
+				  (unsigned)pauth->auth_context_id));
+			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+			return;
+		}
+
 		break;
 	}
 
-- 
2.8.1


From 8787dd5053974c1f42ae85a310e9522795f4ccfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 39/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: verify auth_context_id in
 api_pipe_{bind_auth3,alter_context}
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ef461d8304ee36184cd7a3963676eedff4ef1eb)
---
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
index d6c4118..26c4ee0 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
@@ -1364,6 +1364,14 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	if (auth_info.auth_context_id != p->auth.auth_context_id) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Auth context id mismatch! Client sent %u, "
+			  "but auth was started as level %u!\n",
+			  (unsigned)auth_info.auth_context_id,
+			  (unsigned)p->auth.auth_context_id));
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
 	case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
 		ntlmssp_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
@@ -1545,6 +1553,14 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
 			goto err_exit;
 		}
 
+		if (auth_info.auth_context_id != p->auth.auth_context_id) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("Auth context id mismatch! Client sent %u, "
+				  "but auth was started as level %u!\n",
+				  (unsigned)auth_info.auth_context_id,
+				  (unsigned)p->auth.auth_context_id));
+			goto err_exit;
+		}
+
 		switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
 		case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO:
 			spnego_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
-- 
2.8.1


From bf0040fb860527cb0c54ab0ef301153bdad650c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 21:23:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 40/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: disconnect connection on
 protocol errors
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 024d3b263a2879cee4fb7794d70f253c948cc043)
---
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
index ee33e80..a3810f0 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
@@ -953,6 +953,12 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 
 	state->pkt = talloc(state, struct ncacn_packet);
 	if (!state->pkt) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
 		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -962,6 +968,12 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 					  state->pkt,
 					  !state->endianess);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
 		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -979,6 +991,28 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 		  (unsigned)state->reply_pdu_offset,
 		  nt_errstr(status)));
 
+	if (state->pkt->ptype != DCERPC_PKT_FAULT && !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+	} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+	} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RPC_SEC_PKG_ERROR)) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+	}
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
 		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
 		return;
@@ -1003,12 +1037,24 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 			 "%s\n",
 			 state->endianess?"little":"big",
 			 state->pkt->drep[0]?"little":"big"));
-		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	if (state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length > MAX_RPC_DATA_SIZE) {
-		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1016,6 +1062,12 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 	if (state->reply_pdu.length < state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length) {
 		if (!data_blob_realloc(NULL, &state->reply_pdu,
 				state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length)) {
+			/*
+			 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+			 *
+			 * For now do it sync...
+			 */
+			TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
 			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
 			return;
 		}
@@ -1045,6 +1097,14 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
 	subreq = get_complete_frag_send(state, state->ev, state->cli,
 					state->call_id,
 					&state->incoming_frag);
+	if (subreq == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
+		 *
+		 * For now do it sync...
+		 */
+		TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+	}
 	if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
 		return;
 	}
@@ -2574,8 +2634,9 @@ static struct tevent_req *rpccli_bh_disconnect_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 	/*
 	 * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
 	 *
-	 * For now the caller needs to free rpc_cli
+	 * For now we do it sync...
 	 */
+	TALLOC_FREE(hs->rpc_cli->transport);
 	hs->rpc_cli = NULL;
 
 	tevent_req_done(req);
-- 
2.8.1

